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Abstract 
This report critically tests the two hypotheses set forth by respectively Robert Putnam (1988) and 
Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995), that the Danish 92 Group either sought to influence the COP15 
through domestic polities of states, or by working across boundaries in order to gain direct 
influence on the negotiation. As scholars based in the tradition of critical rationalism this report 
critically tests the two hypotheses based on two “less likely” critical case studies, namely the 
Danish 92 Group and the COP15. In analysing their strategies this report has derived four analytical 
indicators: resources, access, activities and discursive practices, which has been operationalized 
with the theoretical assumptions. The report concludes that the Danish 92 Group to a large extent 
sought to influence through the domestic polities, thus providing most explanatory power to 
hypothesis 1 set forth by Putnam. However, the report furthermore finds some areas within the 
analysis, which is not well grasped by hypothesis 1. Thus, hypotheses 2 seem to be strengthened in 
areas, where transnational actors, normative settings and values are taking into account.  
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1.0 Introduction 
The consequences of climate changes are now starting to show around the world. The polar sea ice 
is melting, the sea levels are rising, the world experience longer heat waves, altered ecosystems etc. 
According to most scientists, the effects of the climate changes will only become more severe as 
time goes by, if nothing is done by those who they claim have created the problem – humans (IPCC 
2007: 5, NASA, Hansen et al. 2008: 1). Human activities such as the burning of fossil fuel have 
increased the level of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide (CO2) so that it is now far above any level 
registered in the last 650,000 years. This will have huge social and economic consequences 
according to most predictions (NASA). Professor in the department of Earth and Environmental 
Studies at Columbia University, USA, James Hansen, has in cooperation with other 
experts emphasised the importance of dealing with climate changes. They state: “the stakes, for all 
life on the planet, surpass those of any previous crisis” (Hansen et al. 2008: 12). 
 
Despite the increasing evidence of the risks of climate changes and the improved technical 
knowledge of how to deal with the issue, most experts agree that there has not been done enough to 
deal with the problem. Thus, many scholars argue that this is related to the fact that dealing with 
climate changes is not only a technical issue but very much a political issue too (Harris 2009: 1, 
Jamieson 2008: 475-77). Dealing with climate changes has implications at all levels of society and 
is becoming a complicated matter with importance for all kind of actors, i.e. states, businesses and 
NGOs from all over the world (Harris 2009: 1). This has even sparked a debate in international law, 
that politics changes law, as we know it (Hurd 2014), while notions such as intergenerational 
equity, namely that future generations have rights that need to be taken account of in legal 
instruments is in its genesis (Armstrong 1999: 551). The global character of the issue led to the 
creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 
(UNFCCC 1992). The first Conference of the Parties (COP) was held in 1995, and has ever since 
gathered all Parties to the Convention in a yearly meeting in order to find solutions to address 
climate changes in a democratic manner (Chan 1997). However, the success of the COPs has been 
questioned, mostly because of the lack of sufficient progress (Harris 2009: 1, Hansen et al. 2008: 1-
12). 
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In 2009 the COP15 was held in Copenhagen with a huge build-up of negotiations, conferences and 
great expectations of finally reaching a global binding agreement (Interview Christensen: 90, 
Meilstrup 2010: 26). The COP15 was bigger than any previous COP. More Heads of States, than 
ever before, showed up in order to make sure that the agreement became a reality. The interest and 
participation of non-state actors such as businesses and NGOs were also massive. More than 34,000 
participants from the civil society were attending the COP15 – much more than expected – in order 
to show the importance of the climate issue (Meilstrup 2010: 30).  
 
Non-state actors have been acknowledged as an important part of climate negotiations from the 
very beginning of the COP-gatherings. In the Rio Convention of 1992, which is the guideline for 
the COP, there is a clear acknowledgement of the role of NGOs: 
 
“Non-governmental organizations (...) possess well-established and diverse experience, 
expertise and capacity in fields, which will be of particular importance to the 
implementation and review of environmentally sound and socially responsible 
sustainable development” (UNEP).  
 
The acknowledgment of the role of NGOs in the Rio Convention, as well as the claims of several 
scholars, leads us to an underlying premise that NGOs have some kind of influence and do matter in 
the climate negotiations (Morin & Orisini 2013; Betsill & Corell 2008). Against this backdrop some 
scholars even point to a shift in diplomacy towards new diplomacy, in which citizens play a greater 
role (Melissen 2005, Langhorne 1997). However, it is not always clear how their influence is felt. 
This has sparked an extensive debate among scholars of International Relations about the role of 
non-state actors in international negotiations. Two of the more prominent perspectives in the 
discussion are those of Robert Putnam (1988) and Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995). Putnam claims 
that domestic politics and international relations are closely entangled. He describes states as the 
main actors at the international level, but argues that since they are responsive to domestic pressure, 
non-state actors can work through domestic polities to influence international negotiations (Putnam 
1988).  Risse-Kappen adopts a transnational perspective that differs from Putnam by arguing that 
non-state actors can effectively affect state behaviour by influencing directly on both domestic and 
international policy outcomes (Risse-Kappen 1995). From these theoretical assumptions, we derive 
two hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1: NGOs pursue influence on international negotiations through domestic polities of 
states, which we derive from the theoretical assumptions by Putnam.  
 
Hypothesis 2: NGOs work across boundaries and seek to influence directly on international 
negotiations, which we derive from the theoretical assumptions by Risse-Kappen.  
 
We will seek to investigate the explanatory power of both hypotheses by applying them to two “less 
likely” critical cases. In order to test our hypotheses in the best possible way, we have chosen the 
Danish 92 Group as our first “less likely” critical case. The Danish 92 Group is the greatest network 
of NGOs in Denmark, while they work across boundaries in order to influence policy decisions. As 
international negotiations are largely the domain of states, the findings of NGO strategies in relation 
to influencing international negotiations constitute a quite interesting empirical puzzle, in which we 
would like to examine. Thus, we have furthermore chosen COP15 as the political venue for this 
study, which will serve as the second “less likely” critical case. As numerous observers argue that 
the COP15 was highly influenced by an internal dispute between the Ministry of Climate and 
Energy and the Prime Minister's Office, the COP15 will work as a “less likely” critical case, as it 
could be argued that the internal disputes within the Danish ministry diminished the NGO 
influence, as they had to focus on “two presidencies” rather than one (Interview Lidegaard, 
Interview Christensen, Interview Jensen, Meilstrup 2010).  
 
Thus, we have chosen to examine the ways NGOs seek to influence international negotiations at the 
COP15, in the case of the Danish 92 Group. This leads to the following problem statement:  
 
1.2 Problem statement 
To what extent did NGOs seek to influence the COP15 through domestic polities of states or by 
working across boundaries in order to gain direct influence on the negotiations? 
 
1.3 Explanation of problem statement 
In this section we will briefly elaborate on our problem statement, in order to define what we mean 
by the different terms and concepts set forth herein. 
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First of all, it is important to highlight that the underlying premise of this study will be based on the 
assumption that NGOs do matter in international environmental negotiations, and that they do 
engage and influence the COPs despite the dominance of states. This assumption is supported by a 
significant amount of literature in the academic field (Betsill & Corell 2008, Keck & Sikkink 1998, 
Lund 2013, Downie 2014 among others). 
 
Second, the aim of this report is to investigate, which strategies NGOs used in order to seek 
influence at the COP15. Our theoretical chapter present the overall theoretical framework, which 
will constitute our two hypotheses. From Putnam we have adopted the theoretical assumptions of 
hypothesis 1, which holds: NGOs pursue influence on international negotiations through domestic 
polities of states. From Risse-Kappen we have adopted the theoretical assumptions of hypothesis 2, 
which holds: NGOs work across boundaries and seek to influence directly on international 
negotiations. This will be further clarified in the theory chapter (page 13) and operationalized in the 
methodology chapter (Page 32). 
 
We intend to test the robustness of the two hypotheses on the case of the Danish 92 Group at the 
COP15, which will both work as “less likely” critical cases. Due to the low institutionalisation of 
COP15 and the fact that international negotiations are largely the domain of states, this venue will 
work as a “less likely” critical case throughout this report. Furthermore, we intend to use the Danish 
92 Group as a “less likely” critical case. As Denmark held the Presidency during COP15 it could be 
argued that Denmark would be evasive towards listening to Danish NGOs, as Denmark would be 
expected to pursue a broader strategy related to the EU or UNFCCC, or that they were expected to 
not even having a position at all (Meilstrup 2010: 82, Interview Lidegaard: 112) Thus, both the 
Danish 92 Group and the COP15 will work as a “less likely” critical case during this study, as they 
are less likely to fulfil the theoretical predictions. We intend to clarify our case study further in the 
chapter on methodology (page 26).  
 
Thirdly, it is an important task to define what we mean by the term NGOs. In this report, the term 
NGO will refer to a broad range of actors such as environmental organisations, scientific 
organisations and environmental NGOs both on a national and international level. We will however 
work with a narrow term of non-state actors, as we do not intend to include Multinational 
Organizations (MNCs) or Trade Associations.  
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In order to test the explanatory power of the hypotheses, the Danish 92 Group is chosen as a “less 
likely” critical case in order to exemplify how NGOs pursued influence at the COP15.  
 
Fourthly, whenever this study refers to government representatives we are referring to a broader 
term, which includes the chief negotiators, ministers and primary civil servants from respectively 
the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Climate and Energy. Common to them, is the fact 
that they are representatives of the Danish Presidency at the COP15.  
 
Finally, it is important to mention that we are working within a certain timeframe when 
investigating the COP15. This report will work with a standard political science time frame, where 
we intend to focus on the interactions between the predefined actors during the COP15. However, 
we will include and interpret on preceding events in order to make sense of the entire venue.  
 
1.4 The Danish 92 Group 
In this subsection, we would like to provide a brief introduction to the case of the Danish 92 Group. 
The Danish 92 Group is a network organisation that consists of 23 Danish environmental and 
development NGOs (the Danish 92 Group) 1. It was created in connection to the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.  Its main focus is to 
promote sustainable development in Denmark and globally. The network is currently working on 
three main issues: climate, the post-2015 process and CSR (Interview Christensen: 88). They seek 
to affect the global climate change negotiations in order to secure a fair and ambitious agreement 
(the Danish 92 Group). According to the coordinator of the Danish 92 Group, Troels Dam 
Christensen, NGOs join the network in order to create joint coordination and policy development 
(Interview Christensen: 88). The Danish 92 Group is also a part of the Climate Action Network 
(CAN), which is a transnational network of more than 950 NGOs from all over the world, who has 
joined together to combat climate change (CAN a).  
 																																																								
1The following NGOs are members of the Danish 92 Group: Afrika Kontakt, Amnesty International, Care, Danmarks 
Naturfredningsforening, Dansk International Bosætningsservice, Dansk Ornitologisk Forening, Det Økologiske Råd, 
FN Forbundet, Folkekirkens Nødhjælp, Greenpeace, International Work Group for Indigenous Groups,  
Landsforeningen for Økosamfund, Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke, Natur&Ungdom, Sax og Samfund, U-landsforeningen 
Svalerne, Røde Kors, Øko-net, WWF, Verdens Skove, IBIS Danmark, Vedvarende Energi and Kvindernes U-
landsudvalg.  
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CAN apply a number of strategies in order to pursue its interests. These includes: 
 
 “Active participation in the international climate change negotiations and all other 
relevant fora” and “placing new climate change, equity and sustainable development 
issues on the global agenda” (CAN b).  
 
During the COP15, the Danish 92 Group worked in collaboration with CAN in order to influence 
the negotiations. Their common goal at this particular COP was to secure a fair and binding 
agreement (Interview Christensen: 92). 
 
1.5 COP15 
This subsection will likewise provide a brief presentation of the COP15. The COP15 took place in 
Copenhagen from the 7th – 19th of December 2009. COP15 was supposed to mark the end of the 
Bali Road Map, which was a two-year negotiation process. The Bali Road Map was negotiated at 
the COP13, and the hope was that it should lead to a binding agreement in Copenhagen (Earth 
Negotiation Bulletin 2009: 1-2). The COP15 also became the first COP where the free access of 
NGOs proved impossible to accomplish. When the importance and expectations of COP15 became 
clear, huge amounts of NGOs applied for participation. As the UN accredited 45,000 people access 
– with room for only 15,000 in Bella Center Copenhagen – it left a huge part of the NGO 
community out in the cold (Chernela et al. 2010: 1). While this limited the access for many NGOs 
such as Friends of the Earth and Avaaz, the Danish 92 Group were granted access.   
 
The expectations before COP15 were marked by a strong belief among most observers and 
participants that a global and binding agreement could be achieved (Earth Negotiation Bulletin 
2009: 1-2, Interview Christensen: 88). The stakes were therefore high, and the participants saw it as 
a great opportunity to take the steps needed in order to address climate changes. Furthermore, the 
115 Heads of States, present at COP15, indicated that the climate had become an issue of high 
priority globally. However, the COP15 was characterised by a number of rather chaotic events, and 
the negotiations were soon subject to serious concerns.  
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Even before the COP started there were rumours of a “Danish text”, which was created outside of 
the open discussions, and only shown to a selected number of countries (Earth Negotiation Bulletin 
2009: 27-28, Meilstrup 2010: 10, Interview Christensen: 98).  
This led to much criticism of the Danish Presidency, and many countries believed it contradicted 
with the democratic and transparent traditions of the UNFCCC-procedure. On the last day of the 
COP15, a non-binding deal was agreed between a small group of countries. The agreement was 
called the Copenhagen Accord, and was negotiated between the US, China, Brazil, India and South 
Africa (The Guardian). 
 
There is a general agreement among most observers and people who were present at COP15, that 
the end result was disappointing. Many people even argue that it was a complete failure (The 
Guardian, Earth Negotiation Bulletin 2009: 27-29, Interview Christensen: 91), while others argue 
that the Copenhagen Accord was an important step towards future agreements (Interview 
Lidegaard: 126, Houser 2010: 14, Earth Negotiation Bulletin 2009: 27-29).  
 
The COP15 was also marked by a conflict within the Danish government, which ended up having a 
great effect on the result of the negotiations (Meilstrup 2010). When Denmark gained the 
Presidency of the COP15 it was the result of intense work by especially the Minister of Climate and 
Energy, Connie Hedegaard, and her closest civil servants. The initiative was also supported by 
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who was keen to promote Denmark by hosting a big 
international meeting like the COP (Meilstrup 2010: 32-41). Traditionally, it is the Ministry of 
Climate and Energy who deals with the negotiations before and during the COPs. In the case of the 
COP15 the Prime Minister’s Office also participated heavily, which eventually led to a conflict 
between the ministries. This affected the trust of especially many developing countries towards 
Denmark, and it also affected the Danish NGOs’ relationship with the government (Meilstrup 2010: 
14-16; Interview Christensen: 99).  
 
The conflict between the ministries developed over the more than two years long negotiation 
process. It was essentially based on a disagreement about, which negotiation strategy Denmark 
should pursue, and which role the country should play in the UN negotiations. As Connie 
Hedegaard and her civil servants had come up with the idea of Denmark hosting the COP15, they 
felt a certain ownership of the Danish Presidency.  
 	 11	
This understanding was not shared by the Prime Minister’s Office, who felt they should have the 
final say, and kept overruling the Ministry of Climate and Energy on important matters (Meilstrup 
2010: 68-70). The Ministry of Climate and Energy, with top civil servant Thomas Becker in the 
lead, felt that the Prime Minister’s Office lacked the knowledge of the processes and the diplomatic 
touch needed, in order to get all countries on board. Furthermore, there was a big disagreement in 
the fall of 2009, when the Prime Minister’s Office decided to move away from the goal of a legally 
binding agreement, and simply work for a politically binding agreement. The Ministry of Climate 
and Energy did not approve of this strategy, as they felt that the pressure of a legal agreement was 
needed, in order to push the countries as far as possible (Meilstrup 2010: 68-70). The conflict 
between the two ministries led to significant problems in creating as good a negotiation process as 
possible – which is basically the role of the COP Presidency (Meilstrup 2010: 19).  
 
1.6 Structure of the report 
In this section, we would like to present the structure of the report and explain our intention with 
each section accordingly.  
    
1. Introduction: The introduction should now have provided the reader with a presentation of the 
study. This includes a presentation of the problem statement, the elaboration of the problem 
statement, and finally an overview of our two critical cases, the Danish 92 Group and the COP15.  
 
2. Theory: This chapter will introduce the theoretical framework that forms the two hypotheses: the 
domestic perspective, represented by Robert Putnam (1988), and the transnational perspective, 
represented by Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995). Furthermore, this section will provide a critical 
assessment of the theoretical framework.  
  
3. Methodology: In this chapter we intend to outline our methodological considerations on how we 
seek to answer our problem statement. This section will furthermore provide an overview of our 
two critical case studies, the empirical data and a critical reflection of our gathered material. In 
addition, we will present four analytical indicators, in which we intend to operationalize from the 
empirical framework. These indicators are: resources, access, activities and discursive practices, 
and they will serve both as analytical indicators and as the overall analytical strategy.   
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4. Analysis: In order to test the hypotheses based on the two critical cases our analysis will be 
structured in the following way:  
 
• Analysis: The analysis will serve to analyse which strategies the Danish 92 Group pursued 
in order to influence policymaking at the COP15. In order to investigate these strategies we 
will draw upon four analytical indicators, which will furthermore serve as an analytical 
strategy. The indicators are: resources, access, activities and discursive practices. During the 
analysis we will critically test our findings from each of the analytical indicators in 
accordance with our two hypotheses. Thus, in this section we wish to determine how and to 
what extent hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 have explanatory power in explaining to what 
extent the Danish 92 Group sought to influence the COP15.  
• Analytical discussion: In this section we seek to include an analytical discussion, which 
intend to discuss and critically assess our analytical findings. Within the discussion we seek 
to discuss how the explanatory power of our hypotheses was affected by our very strict case 
design.  
 
5. Conclusion: This chapter will present our final conclusion to our problem statement. 
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2.0 Theory 
The participation of NGOs in global environmental politics is well documented (Betsill & Corell 
2001: 65). A growing academic literature has shown that NGOs has become important actors in 
influencing government decisions when developing both domestic policies, negotiating 
international treaties as well as in defining how individuals perceive environmental problems 
(Betsill & Corell 2001, 2008, Lund 2013). In mapping out the influence of these actors, most 
studies ascribe non-state actors with significant impact on international negotiations. However, it is 
not always clear how their influence is felt and which strategies are the most efficient, especially 
with regard to international climate negotiations that stretch for years or decades (Downie 2014: 
376). In the next section we therefore intend to draw out two theoretical pathways for analysing the 
strategies of NGOs: either they pursue influence through domestic polities of states, or they work 
across boundaries to seek to influence directly on international negotiations. These pathways will 
each serve as a theoretical framework for each hypothesis, that we seek to critically test, and which 
will primarily be based on Robert Putnam (1988), Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) and briefly touch 
upon Peter M. Haas (1992). 
 
In order to establish a framework for analysis, the first section intends to draw out the theoretical 
debates surrounding each hypothesis. Hence, it will provide a brief literature review of the 
theoretical debates surrounding hypothesis 1, while also pinning down the main theoretical 
assumptions derived from Robert Putnam, which will constitute hypothesis 1. The next section will 
be structured likewise in relation to hypothesis 2, which will be based on the theoretical 
assumptions derived from Thomas Risse-Kappen and Peter Haas. Combined, these theories will 
serve as an operationalization of our overall theoretical understanding of how NGOs seek influence 
in international environmental negotiations, which will be further explained in the chapter on 
methodology (page 25). Finally, the last section will provide a critical assessment of the theoretical 
framework. 
 
2.1 The state-centric approach 
The role of states has for many scholars of International Relations (IR) been the most common unit 
of analysis (Lake 2008: 41).  
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This is the case in many of the mainstream theories such as realism (Donnelly 2006, Walt 1997), 
neorealism (Waltz 1979), neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984), liberal internationalism 
(Ikenberry 2011) and the english school (Bull 1977). In some of these state-centric views, states are 
seen as unitary actors with clearly defined national interests. For scholars based in realism, national 
interests are often assumed to be state power, whereas for scholars based in neorealism, national 
interests are often perceived as state survival or state power. Thus, for both it is assumed that states 
are the appropriate unit of analysis, as it is furthermore assumed that state survival and state power 
occurs at the level of the nation state (Lake 2008: 43). Even though states are their main research 
object, most scholars within the state-centric approach do acknowledge that states are not the only 
political actors in the international system (Lake 2008: 42). This is exemplified by neorealist 
Kenneth Waltz who states that: “states are not and never have been the only international actors” 
(Waltz 1979: 93-94). However, even though this implies an acknowledgement of non-state actors, 
their role is not clearly defined. In the state-centric approaches there are a general belief that states 
are the defining and central actors in order to find explanatory factors for development at the 
international stage (Lake 2008: 42). 
 
The idea of national interests defined irrespective of domestic politics has been subject of much 
criticism from IR scholars, as some claim there is no such thing as pre-defined national interests 
(Milner 1992, Putnam 1988, Moravcsik 1997). Hence, the argument is that government policy is 
constrained by underlying identities, different interests and power relations among individuals and 
groups who constantly pressure the decision makers to pursue policies in regard to their own 
interests. Robert Putnam’s theory of the “two-level games” is an attempt to create an understanding 
of the correlation between the international system and the domestic politics, as he claims these two 
entities cannot be separated because they influence each other simultaneously. With his metaphor 
“the two-level games” Putnam assumes that governments of states play at two different tables: one 
table where negotiators from different states sit and another table where the national negotiator sit 
along with domestic actors such as interest groups. Thus, political decisions can only be 
implemented if they are accepted at both tables (Putnam 1988: 433-441).  
 
The American scholar Andrew Moravcsik (1993) draws upon this notion of the two-level games, 
when trying to explain European integration. In developing his theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism Moravcsik argues, that the major choice in favour of the European Union 
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was a reflection of the preference of national governments, not of the preferences of supranational 
organisations. Hence, Moravcsik offers a more state-centric approach, as he claims that domestic 
analysis is a precondition for systemic analysis (Moravcsik 1993: 481). While Moravcsik works 
with a premise characterised by a more parsimonious state-centric view, the underlying logic in the 
work of Putnam’s two-level games is different. Putnam does draw some parallels between his 
theory on the two-level games and the state-centric literature. However he argues, unlike the state-
centric literature, that domestic conflict is an inevitable factor in shaping national interests (Putnam 
1988: 459-460).  
 
Hence, Putnam’s two-level games do leave some room for manoeuvre for non-state actors to have a 
degree of influence on international negotiations, wherefore our first hypothesis will be derived 
from this line of theoretical thinking and work with the assumption that: NGOs pursue influence on 
international negotiations through domestic polities of states. Hence, in the following subsection 
we wish to unfurl this hypothesis by presenting the theoretical assumptions of the two-level games 
by Robert Putnam.  
 
2.1.1 Robert Putnam 
The theory of the two-level games by Putnam is founded on an acknowledgement of the fact that 
domestic politics and international relations are entangled. Putnam argues that the politics of many 
international negotiations can be perceived as a two-level game. The first level is the international, 
where national governments are the main actors who balance between the need to satisfy domestic 
pressures while at the same time addressing foreign developments. The second level is the national, 
where domestic groups seek to get influence on government policies and where politicians try to 
form coalitions with these groups in order to gain more power (Putnam 1988: 434). Putnam thereby 
acknowledges the complexity of international negotiations and seeks to address this by setting up an 
analytical framework for investigating how and when diplomacy and domestic politics interact 
(Putnam 1988: 430).  
 
Putnam divides the negotiating process into two levels (Putnam 1988: 436): 
1. Level I: The negotiation phase, where chief negotiators bargain and reach a tentative agreement. 
2. Level II: The ratification phase, where the government representatives discuss separately with 
their group of domestic constituents whether to ratify the agreement.  
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The actors represented at this level may be domestic political institutions, bureaucratic agencies, 
interests groups, social classes or the public opinion. Following this line of reasoning, we would 
argue that the Danish 92 Group would be represented at Level II. This interpretation of the 
negotiating process is only meant to be understood as an analytical tool and is not descriptively 
accurate. In practice, Putnam emphasises that the two levels affect each other in a very diffuse 
manner because of expectational effects. This implies that the expectations of the Level II reaction 
to a progressing agreement are likely to deeply influence the negotiation at Level I (Putnam 1988: 
436). Thereby, domestic dynamics can constrain government representatives before and during the 
negotiation at Level I. Putnam points to the fact that negotiators often spend as much time 
negotiating with domestic actors as with foreign counterparts (Putnam 1988: 433). It should be 
noted that Putnam uses the term chief negotiators to describe the actors present at Level I, but in 
this report these will be referred to as government representatives.  
 
Furthermore, he emphasises the importance of differentiating between voluntary and involuntary 
defection, where the latter is a result of negotiators being unable to ratify an agreement domestically 
(Putnam 1988: 438-439). The fear of such an event is another aspect that makes it possible for 
Level II actors to influence Level I. Finally Putnam defines the shape of a Level II win-set as an 
important factor in international negotiations (Putnam 1988: 437-438). A win-set is defined as the 
set of all Level I agreements that would be able to gain the necessary support among Level II actors. 
Hence, it can be seen as the negotiation room that the Level I negotiator has to navigate in. Its size 
is defined by the Level II preference, coalitions and institutions as well as the Level I negotiators’ 
strategies (Putnam 1988: 442). A large win-set increases the possibility of reaching an agreement at 
Level I. The key actor in Putnam’s analytical framework is the government representative, who is 
the only player that appears on both levels. A government representative’s credibility as a 
negotiator at Level I is affected by his demonstrated ability to get the agreement ratified at Level II 
(Putnam 1988: 439).  
 
In relation to Putnam, the report therefore investigates the strategies pursued by Level II actors to 
influence government representatives. Our focus is on the Danish 92 Group who in the two-level 
game theory is perceived as a smaller player limited to stay only at one level, hence the Level II. 
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2.2 The transnational perspective 
The state-centric view set forth by different scholars within International Relations has fostered 
much criticism by e.g. the liberal institutionalism camp, who argues that states have lost control due 
to an erosion of state sovereignty and a general growth of transnational forces (Keohane & Nye 
1971: 329, Barnett & Sikkink 2008: 62-66). As private non-state actors, such as the cosmopolitans 
(Hollinger 2002, Beck 2002) or multinational corporations (MNCs), are free to organise and move 
across national borders, these entities have become actors in the international arena and competitors 
of the nation states. They further claim that the populations within the nation state has started to 
identify themselves with values and interest from the outside and not necessarily with the nation 
state as a whole (Keohane & Nye 1971: 330).  
 
While John Hobson (2009) would argue that globalization and global interactions can be seen as 
vital in generating sovereignty, Janice Thomson (1995) would claim, that sovereignty always 
appear to be in a constant mode of change, growing stronger or weaker. In addition to this, Robert 
Jackson (2007) is pointing to state sovereignty evolving in response to scientific, technological, 
economic and social changes. The fact that globalisation plays a greater part in IR has limited points 
of contention. Thus, Barnett & Sikkink (2008) would argue that there is a tendency for IR to move 
from the study of international relations to the study of global society, as there is an increasing 
recognising of nation states sharing the world stage with numerous non-state actors such as MNCs 
and NGOs (Barnett & Sikkink 2008: 62-63).  
 
The state-centric view is thus challenged, when arguing that multiple actors are influencing the 
global society at many different levels, i.e. globally, regionally, and locally. As a result:  
 
“(…) Global governance no longer reflect solely the interests of states, but now also 
include other actors, including IO's, transnational corporations, nongovernmental 
organizations, and new kinds of networks” (Barnett & Sikkink 2008: 64). 
 
Although states continue to be important actors when trying to understand international politics, 
NGOs and other non-state actors exist within a world of states and are therefore acting inside this 
system (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 4).  
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The world stage is now characterized by a rise in NGOs (Betsill & Corell 2001), a rise in MNCs 
(Dauvergne & Lister 2011), and a rise in transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink 1998). 
Therefore the unit of analysis shifts as more and more actors play a much greater part in shaping the 
actions and perceptions of states. 
 
Putnam and his metaphor of the two-level games does provide liberal scholars with much more 
leverage to allow seeing international relations as a two-way street, in which non-state actors can 
influence domestic politics, while domestic politics likewise influence their international positions. 
However, this theoretical reasoning is still too narrow, as it implies a limited access to the 
international system, which no longer holds true (Keck & Sikkink 1988: 4). Thus, some scholars 
argue that state preferences are not just shaped by social groups domestically but just as much by 
transnational networks, who are working across borders. This creates a new perspective, where the 
control of states over the international processes is diminishing, and where international politics is 
shaped by a mixture of different actors such as states, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs 
(Downie 2014: 379).  
 
One of the constructivist contributions in this line of reasoning is Thomas Risse-Kappen who offers 
a revival of the academic debate on transnational relations that originally started in the 1970s, but in 
his opinion “was shut down to soon” (Risse-Kappen 1995: 5). While the earlier arguments 
addressed the controversy between a “state-centred” versus a “society-dominated” view on world 
politics, Risse-Kappen claims that we should instead examine how the interstate world interacts 
with the society world of transnational relations (Risse-Kappen 1995: 5, 15). In his view, no one 
can deny the importance of the state, and we do not have to disregard the state in order to show the 
influence of transnational relations in world politics (Risse-Kappen 1995: 15). Hence, international 
outcomes cannot be grasped fully without taking into account that the national boundaries are 
subject to regular interactions where at least one actor is a non-state actor or does not represent a 
national government or an intergovernmental organisation (Risse-Kappen 1995: 3). Thus, our 
second hypothesis will be derived from this theoretical line of reasoning working with the 
assumption that: NGOs work across boundaries and seek to influence international negotiations 
directly. Hence, in the following chapter we wish to unfurl this hypothesis by presenting the 
theoretical assumptions on transnational perspective set forth by Risse-Kappen and briefly touch 
upon Peter Haas’ work on epistemic communities. 
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2.2.1 Thomas Risse-Kappen 
As previously mentioned, the two-level game by Putnam does link international relations and 
domestic politics, but accepts the premise of the state-centred paradigm. This is, in the view of 
Risse-Kappen, too narrow, as it does not make sense to study international relations through the 
lenses of either a state-centred paradigm or a society-dominated paradigm, as the two paradigms 
individually tend to ignore the link between society and societal actors across national boundaries 
(Risse-Kappen 1995: 16). 
 
In order to give the debate on transnational relations a revival and bridge the gap between the two 
paradigms, Risse-Kappen combines two theoretical concepts: domestic structures and degrees of 
international institutions from a constructivist point of view. In short, he argues: 
 
“The impact of transnational actors and coalitions on state policies is likely to vary 
according to: 
• differences in domestic structures, i.e., the normative and organizational 
arrangements which form the "state," structure society, and link the two in the 
polity; and 
• degree of international institutionalization, i.e., the extent to which the specific 
issue-area is regulated by bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes, and/or 
international organizations.” (Risse-Kappen 1995: 6) 
 
In this sense, Risse-Kappen argues that transnational actors’ ability to influence is also determined 
by the degree of international institutionalisation. Risse-Kappen argues that international 
institutions are expected to facilitate the access of transnational actors (Risse-Kappen 1995: 29). It 
should thus be easier for transnational actors to seek influence on governments within the 
framework of international institutions. By referring to international institutionalisation and 
multilateral regimes, Risse-Kappen draws upon a wider notion of regime theory in IR. As 
mentioned above, while realism would argue that conflict was the norm in IR, regime theorist such 
as Keohane (1984) and Krasner (1983) would argue that we see cooperation despite anarchy. 
Krasner defines international regimes as:  
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“A set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decisions-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations 
(Krasner 1983: 186). 
 
This stands in opposition to Susan Strange (1998), who would argue that regimes are a misleading 
concept. According to Krasner, regimes must be understood as something more than temporary 
arrangements, which change with power and national interests. Drawing upon Keohane, he argues 
that there is a clear distinction between agreements and regimes: Whereas agreements relates to an 
ad hoc, often “one-shot” arrangement, the purpose of a regime is to facilitate agreements, thus 
arguing that regimes are a form of cooperation which is more than the following of short-run self-
interest (Krasner 1983: 186-187). From this point of view the COP15 cannot be seen as a highly 
institutionalised venue, thus in relation to this study, it therefore serves as a “less-likely” critical 
case, when testing the hypothesis set forth by Risse-Kappen.  
 
In relations to domestic structures and international institutionalisation Risse-Kappen furthermore 
argues, that they are likely to interact. The higher degree of regulation by international norms of 
cooperation in the policy area in question, the more likely it will be that transnational activities will 
take place, as high standards of cooperation will prevail over strict domestic structures (Risse-
Kappen 1995: 7). Thereby, the possibility for NGOs such as the Danish 92 Group to have an impact 
on state negotiations is to a large extent determined by the existing structures, as they will have to 
adjust to these structures in order to gain influence. 
 
Furthermore, Risse-Kappen argues that the success of transnational coalitions to some extent 
depend on whether they are able to persuade or line up with domestic and governmental actors in 
the targeted country (Risse-Kappen 1995: 13). He states that transnational actors have to overcome 
two hurdles in order to have policy impact in their targeted countries (Risse-Kappen 1995: 25). 
First, it is necessary to gain access to the political systems. Second, it is important to create or 
contribute to winning coalitions. These are defined as policy coalitions, which successfully manage 
to change decisions in the desired direction. In regard to winning coalitions, Risse-Kappen argues 
that international institutions within the issue-area should in fact reduce the need for domestic 
coalition building and make it easier for transnational actors to influence policy decisions directly 
(Risse-Kappen 1995: 32). 
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Finally, Risse-Kappen does acknowledge that transnational relations leaves room for many different 
non-state actors, which could be studied. Thus, he limits his focus to two different sets of actors: 
those motivated by economical gains, such as MNCs, and those actors promoting principled ideas 
and knowledge, i.e. NGOs (Risse-Kappen 1995: 8). Hence, this report further seeks to limit the 
category of non-state actors by only investigating those actors promoting ideas and knowledge. This 
group of non-state actors can engage in epistemic communities, which Risse-Kappen derives from 
the theoretical writings by Peter Haas (1992).  
Delimiting ourselves from other aspects of Haas’ theoretical work, we wish only to include his 
notion of epistemic communities in the report. Haas argues that it is possible for non-state actors to 
change states’ interests by working as epistemic communities. These are defined as networks: “of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992: 3). 
Thereby, knowledge becomes an important tool of influence. As a transnational epistemic 
community, it is possible to influence state interests by either identifying them for the decision 
makers or by pointing to the most important aspects of an issue and thereby let the decision makers 
define their interests (Haas 1992: 4). An important strategy for NGOs within the transnational 
perspective would thus be to work as an epistemic community and thereby change state interests in 
the desired direction. 
 
2.3 Sub conclusion 
Based on these theoretical frameworks we can derive certain perceptions that will constitute the two 
hypotheses in this report. We derive our theoretical assumptions of hypothesis 1 from Putnam, who 
argues that NGOs pursue influence on international negotiations through domestic polities of states. 
In order to work with this hypothesis in practice we derive three theoretical assumptions in order to 
test the explanatory power of this theory: 
 
• Government representatives have a monopoly on external representation of the state. 
• The principal tool for Level II actors to exploit the two-level game is to influence domestic 
political dynamics. 
• Government representatives are to a large extent responsive to domestic pressure. 
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Likewise, we derive our theoretical assumptions of hypothesis 2 from the theoretical framework set 
forth by Risse-Kappen and Haas. In order to work with this hypothesis in practice we derive three 
theoretical assumptions in order to test the explanatory power of this theory: 
 
• In international negotiations government representatives do not have a monopoly on the 
external representation of the state. 
• NGOs can work transnationally in order to gain influence, but they must adjust to the 
existing structures. 
• Epistemic communities are an important tool for NGOs to have an impact on international 
negotiations. 
 
2.4 Critical assessment of the theoretical framework 
In this section we intend to outline the relevant considerations about the deficiencies of our 
theoretical framework. These considerations are important in order to be able to take them into 
account in the study. 
 
Firstly, we wish to address the compatibility of the two hypotheses. As described earlier, they are 
derived from two theoretical perspectives based on the work of Putnam and Risse-Kappen. This 
could be problematic in the sense that these scholars represent two different theoretical 
understandings. Putnam belongs to the rationalist tradition, whereas Risse-Kappen leans towards 
constructivism. The differences between the two traditions’ ways of studying international politics 
have led to an ongoing debate within the field (Moravcsik 2001, Panke 2004). Often constructivist 
and rationalist hypotheses end up overlapping each other as they address similar research questions 
(Panke 2004: 2). Checkel (2001) argues that these overlaps to some extent can be seen as an 
advantage as they make it more likely to capture the empirical reality that is investigated (Checkel 
2001: 241). Panke (2004) further specifies the argument by saying that neither of the two 
approaches alone is able to fully clarify the influence of “weak” actors such as NGOs (Panke 2004: 
3). Therefore, as we investigate the Danish 92 Group’s strategies to gain influence at the COP15, it 
can be seen as a clear advantage that our hypotheses allow us to investigate NGO influence from 
both a rationalist and constructivist perspective. 
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Second, obviously the choice of using the theories of Putnam and Risse-Kappen affect our study in 
a number of ways. Starting with Putnam, Mitchell (2001) argues that a consequence of Putnam’s 
focus on domestic pressure makes him oversimplify the nature of the international system (Mitchell 
2001: 29). Therefore, many studies, which have elaborated on the two-level game, have ended up 
working with the international level as a bilateral negotiation (Mitchell 2001: 28). As we apply the 
two-level game in a study of multilateral negotiations, this is a point that we have to be aware of. 
Furthermore, Moravcsik (1993) points to the fact that Putnam mainly uses cases on negotiations 
about economic cooperation between advanced industrialised democracies, when he exemplifies his 
theory (Moravcsik 1993: 17-18). According to Moravcsik, these types of negotiations are said to be 
biased towards domestic theories (Moravcsik 1993: 17). This leads us to consider to what degree 
the two-level game theory applies to our case. COP15 is an international climate negotiation, where 
nearly all countries in the world are gathered in other to reach a consensus-based agreement, cf. 
COP15 (page 9). Democratically elected leaders thus have to bargain with non-democratic leaders, 
whose domestic pressure is quite different. Thereby, both the actors and the political arena vary 
from the cases Putnam addresses. However, Moravcsik points to several studies, which have shown 
that the two-level game theory is applicable to cases of very different characters (Moravcsik 1993: 
18).  
 
Thirdly, looking at Risse-Kappen’s transnational perspective, the main critique of relevance to this 
study is given by Van Apeldoorn (2004). He claims that Risse-Kappen’s approach to the study of 
transnational relations to a large extent focus on transnational actors rather than transnational 
structures. This implies that while Risse-Kappen gives a thorough explanation on the dynamics 
between transnational actors and domestic structures, it only briefly touch upon the relationship 
between transnational actors- and structures (Van Apeldoorn 2004: 148). According to Van 
Apeldoorn, the transnational perspective’s notion of structures beyond the national state-society 
complexes is rather limited, and only related to international institutions, which he defines as e.g. 
international organisations and international regimes.  
 
Fourthly, as mentioned earlier, the COP could be argued to have a low institutionalisation. In 
comparison, the cases addressed by both Putnam and Risse-Kappen can be said to have a higher 
degree of institutionalisation.  
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As mentioned earlier, Putnam primarily uses examples of negotiations on economic cooperation, 
which most often take place within well-defined institutionalised settings, where the aim of all 
participants can be said to be quite clear. The same is true in regard to the cases applied by Risse-
Kappen, who use e.g. the institutionalised negotiation on the Montreal Protocol to exemplify his 
theoretical assumptions. However, this serves to exemplify the scope of our critical case design.  
 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the two main theories in the report are not in stark 
opposition to each other. Although Putnam places his theory within the state-centric understanding, 
he is at the same time open to the possibility of transnational alliances. He gives the example of 
two-level games in the European Union being influenced by e.g. groups of national spokesmen 
from different member countries (Putnam 1988: 459). However, he never elaborates on this point. 
Thereby his theory opens up for the explanatory power of a more transnational perspective. Risse-
Kappen is also not a “hard-core constructivist”.  
 
As pointed to earlier, his theoretical work mainly addresses domestic rather than transnational 
structures. Hence, he acknowledges that the state continues to be a main actor in the international 
society. The theoretical framework that forms the basis of our hypotheses does thereby not consist 
of two completely opposite theories. This risks to some extent to complicate the analytical work, as 
the same example might give explanatory power to both hypotheses. However, the overlap between 
the theories might also help us capture the empirical reality more fully.  
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3.0 Methodology 
In this chapter, we wish to clarify our methodological considerations and chosen methods, and 
argue how we are going to answer our problem statement. First, we wish clarify our methodological 
considerations and purpose of this research. In the following subsection we will introduce our two 
critical cases, and explain how we intend to apply them to the theoretical framework. Next, we will 
present our empirical data, and how we have processed the data, while also critically assessing the 
empirical framework. Finally, we will end this chapter with an operationalization of the empirical 
and theoretical framework in order to present the analytical strategy.  
 
3.1 Methodological considerations 
Although the conditions under which NGOs are likely to influence negotiations have been subject 
to a large number of studies over the years, conclusions remain fragmented. In order to facilitate 
further research on this topic, this report provides a contribution to the on-going debate on how 
NGOs pursue influence in international environmental negotiations from a critical rationalist 
position. Thus, the purpose of this research is to increase our understanding of the world we live in. 
Our fundamental perspective of knowledge is in this sense epistemologically realistic. When 
producing scientific papers, you will always have a certain viewpoint and a certain objective, which 
will affect and mould the report. We will therefore never be able to produce an objective truth 
(Koch 2013: 82-83). We do however believe that it is possible to generate knowledge about the 
world “out there”. Some objectives do exist, even though our knowledge of them alters, in this 
sense our fundamental view on the existing world is ontological realistic (Koch 2013: 80-81).  
 
As scholars within the critical rationalist tradition, our analysis will be underpinned by a critical 
testing of two hypotheses derived from our theoretical framework. Thus, the purpose of this report 
is primarily to test the robustness of the two hypotheses set forth that either NGOs pursue influence 
on international negotiations through domestic polities of states, or that NGOs work across 
boundaries and seek to influence directly on international negotiations. As we intend to test these 
hypotheses based on two critical cases, the following subsection will introduce our critical cases in 
relation to these methodological considerations, and depict how we intend to use them throughout 
this report.  
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3.2 Case Study 
In line with our critical rationalist approach we intend to test the explanatory power of our two 
hypotheses based on two critical cases. When working with a critical case, the researcher has a 
well-developed theory, and a case is chosen on the grounds that it will provide a better 
understanding of the circumstances, in which the hypothesis will or will not hold (Bryman 2012: 
70, Yin 2009: 47). Furthermore, a critical case is argued to have strategic importance, if the 
researcher intends to clarify a set of general questions (Flyvbjerg 2012: 474).  
 
Thus, we have chosen to work with both the Danish 92 Group and the political venue of COP15 as 
two “less likely” critical cases, in which we intend to critically test and possibly verify which one 
has the most explanatory power of the two (Yin 2009: 48).  
 
We have chosen to work with the Danish 92 Group as a critical case, since we find it an interesting 
case to examine; first, because it is the greatest network of Danish environmental NGOs in 
Denmark, while also being a member CAN, which holds more than 950 members worldwide, cf. 
section 92 group (page 8).  
Although it could be argued that a Danish NGO would tend to favour the explanatory power of 
hypothesis 1 set forth by Putnam, we hold that this specific case is suitable for testing both 
hypotheses equally, due to both the national and international arenas it takes part in. This line of 
argument is supported by the Danish 92 Group, as their coordinator argues for a highly cooperative 
nature across boundaries during the COP15: 
 
“We were kind of the ones coordinating as the hosting (...). So we were actually 
coordinating the NGOs, and helping CAN trying to influence the general NGO 
positions, because of course CAN was shaping the NGO positions internationally as a 
network (Interview Christensen: 92).  
 
Second, we find, in conjunction with our other critical case of COP15, the Danish 92 Group to be 
interesting as they played a central role at this specific COP due to Denmark holding the 
Presidency.  
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“The fact that they (Denmark ed.) had the Presidency also meant that the international 
NGO community was very interested in also influencing them (Denmark ed.), and in 
that sense we were an important middleman in that situation. So CAN for example 
would work with us to influence the Danish government” (Interview Christensen: 92). 
 
Additionally, this fact serves to illustrate why the Danish 92 Group will serve as a “less likely” 
critical case in this report. Since Denmark held the Presidency during COP15, it could be argued 
that Denmark would be evasive towards listening to Danish NGOs, as Denmark would be expected 
to pursue a broader strategy related to the EU or UNFCCC (Interview Lidegaard: 112), or that they 
were expected to not even having a position at all (Meilstrup 2010: 82) In either case it could be 
argued, that the Danish 92 Group will work as a “less likely” critical case during this study, as it is 
less likely to fulfil the theoretical predictions.  
 
This study also intends to use the COP15 as a “less likely” critical case. First of all, we find 
international negotiations interesting to examine in relation to NGOs, as they are largely the 
domains of states. As Parties to the Convention, only states have formal decision-making power, 
while they also ultimately adopt a particular decision (Betsill & Corell 2008: 6). Thus, the findings 
of NGO strategies in relation to influencing international negotiations constitute a quite interesting 
empirical puzzle, which we would like to investigate. In this sense, the COP15 is a “less likely” 
critical case to examine, as NGOs are expected to have limited access and limited influence as a 
non-state actor.  
 
Second, as argued in the chapter on theory (page 13), the COP can be seen as having a low 
institutionalization. Despite the hopes of making COP15 the constitutive moment for UNFCCC, as 
explained in the section on COP15 (page 9), the outcome left the venue under-institutionalized. In 
relation to hypothesis 2, set forth by Risse-Kappen, the COP15 is a “less likely” critical case, as he 
assumes that the ability of transnational actors to influence international negotiations is also 
determined by the degree institutionalisation. Third and finally, after conducting our empirical data, 
we have become aware that the internal dispute between the Ministry of Climate and Energy and 
the Prime Minister's Office is argued to have had an immense effect on the process of COP15, and 
possibly even the outcome (Interview Lidegaard: 114, Interview Christensen: 99, Meilstrup 2010).  
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In this sense, the COP15 is a “less likely” critical case, as it could be argued that the internal dispute 
within the Danish ministries diminished the NGO influence, as they had to focus on “two 
presidencies” rather than one.  
 
By working with these two cases, which critically tests the theoretical propositions set forth, the 
findings of this report will be subject to a greater degree of validity, if the hypotheses manages to be 
verified, despite the use of a “less likely” critical case (Yin 2009: 41-45). As researchers based in 
the critical rationalist tradition we recognise that it is impossible to verify a hypothesis as the 
universal truth - the so-called “problem of induction”, as coined by the David Hume (Millican 
2008: XXXVIII). We therefore realise that verifications and falsifications are closely linked. By 
putting our theoretical framework through the strictest test possible, the possibility of finding a high 
explanatory power of our hypotheses is less likely to occur (Koch 2013: 94-95). Thus, if we 
nevertheless find, that the two hypotheses have any explanatory power, despite the use of a critical 
case, our findings will have a stronger validity (Yin 2009: 41-45).  
 
Although the critical rationalist tradition aims at falsifying theoretical propositions, it does not 
claim to depict the truth (Koch 2013: 97-98). The purpose of a case study is therefore not to find a 
universal explanation, independent from the studied context, but instead to uncover and clarify the 
reality of a specific case (Bryman, 2012: 68-69). One critique towards using a case study is that it is 
too subjective and does not depict an objective reality (Flyvbjerg, 2012: 478). However, we do not 
believe that any knowledge exists, which merely portrays an objective perspective. Yin (2009) 
furthermore argues, that the crucial question is not whether or not the findings can be generalized to 
a wider universe, but rather how well the researcher generates theory out of the findings (Yin 2009: 
15). Yin denotes this as theoretical generalization, which means that the researcher is allowed to 
generalise based on theoretical propositions and not to populations or the universe as a whole (Yin 
2009: 15).  
 
We therefore do not claim to generalise based on this case study, as we are aware that while 
constructing a report, as this one, we will always have a certain viewpoint and a certain objective. 
In this sense, we argue, in line with Bent Flyvbjerg (2012), that context-bound knowledge is more 
valuable than the endless search for universal explanations (Flyvbjerg, 2012: 479ff).  
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3.3 Empirical Data 
In this section we intend to present and critically assess our empirical framework and collection of 
data. We have gathered our empirical data by applying the so-called snowball-method, where one 
source will lead to the next (Lynggaard 2012: 141). By doing so, it creates an immense knowledge 
and makes possible to view the area of interest from several perspectives. Thus, we have been able 
to grasp the whole complexity of the debate as far as possible. We have collected our empirical 
framework from both primary sources such as positions papers, draft decisions, the final agreement 
and, to the extent we are allowed, NGO lobbying material official, and secondary sources such as 
articles, research papers and books.  
 
In order to strengthen our empirical framework, we have furthermore conducted three qualitative 
interviews to get primary data on our critical case studies. Thus, we have adopted the approach of 
data triangulation by combining several materials, while analysing and discussing our research area. 
Data triangulation is defined as “(…) the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon” (Jick 1979: 602). It has been argued, that by using data triangulation, one method (or 
type of data) will compensate for the weaknesses in the other (Jick 1979: 604). By combining 
different sets of data, our study seeks to be strengthened by gaining a more in-depth and 
comprehensive understanding of our problem statement. Our data-triangulation will consist of the 
following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following subsections we intend to present the three different sets of data sources: published 
material, secondary data and interviews, while critically reflecting upon it. Next, we intend to 
present an operationalization of our empirical and theoretical framework followed by a presentation 
of our final analytical strategy.  
Published	material	
Secondary	sources	 Interviews	
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3.3.1 Published material  
While using the “snow-ball method”, we have looked critically upon the collected materials, and 
especially questioned the origin of the data. We have sought to do this by seeking inspiration in the 
critical perspective on sources by Vibeke Ankersborg (2007). Ankersborg argues, that it is of 
utmost importance to view your material critically, as it is man-made (Ankersborg, 2007:16). While 
conducting this report, we have drawn upon different sources of published material to the extent 
this has been possible. We have first of all sought to include official documents from the Danish 92 
Group, such as their position paper at the COP15, official press releases and newsletters.  
 
We have furthermore included documents in a likely manner from CAN such as their newspaper, 
which they published daily during the COP15. Finally, we have included the final document from 
COP15, Copenhagen Accord. According to Ankersborg, the producer will always be represented by 
a specific culture, education or a certain political perspective (Ankersborg, 2007:63). In this sense, 
we have to recognize that our material represent a viewpoint, which is moulded by the political 
perspectives and goals by the NGOs in question. Thus, we have kept this in mind when processing 
our material.  
 
3.3.2 Secondary data sources  
This awareness has also been evident when working with secondary sources. During this report we 
have drawn upon a wide range of secondary sources, such as books, research articles, media reports 
and the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, as this has allowed us to gain a much more comprehensive 
insight. In order to gain a secondary view on the COP15, we have relied heavily on the author Per 
Meilstrup and his book: Kampen om Klimaet (The Fight Over the Climate ed.).  
 
We have from two different informal interviews been able to confirm the depiction of the event set 
forth in this book, wherefore it is on good authority that we draw upon this version. Furthermore, in 
understanding how NGOs pursue influence on international negotiations, we have relied on 
numerous research articles and research papers such as Betsill & Corell (2008), Emma Lund 
(2013), Kruse (2012) and Downie (2014). We are aware that secondary sources are always a 
depiction of other people’s experience or research, which is per definition attached to insecurity 
(Ankersborg, 2007: 59).  
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Therefore, we have tried to be critical towards the objective and point of view of the data, and not 
merely accept anything as being neutral, and be open towards new knowledge (Ankersborg, 2007: 
59). Nevertheless, these secondary sources have enabled us to gain a vast amount of knowledge of 
how NGOs pursue influence, which we would not have been able to obtain otherwise.  
 
3.3.3 Interviews 
Diplomacy and international negotiations can be difficult to understand only based on published 
material and secondary sources, wherefore interviews with NGOs and diplomats are crucial for 
obtaining an understanding of what happened in a particular negotiation (Betsill & Corell 2008: 
foreword). In addition to this point, Ankersborg argues that it is highly important to come as close 
to the primary source as possible, as some material has been rewritten numerous times, wherefore 
the primary source can be difficult to track down (Ankersborg 2001: 57). This report has chosen to 
conduct three qualitative interviews, which each provides us with an insight into both the Danish 92 
Group and the government representatives from respectively the Ministry of Climate and Energy 
and the Prime Minister’s Office.  
 
We have conducted one interview with Troels Dam Christensen, who has been the official 
coordinator for the Danish 92 Group since 2007, which is why he played a central role at the 
COP15 by negotiating on behalf of the members of this NGO network. In order to gain insight from 
the perspective of the government representatives, we have in addition conducted an interview with 
Bo Lidegaard, who was the personal advisor on climate issues to the Danish Prime Minister, Lars 
Løkke Rasmussen, during the COP15. Due to the internal dispute within the Danish Presidency 
between the Ministry of Climate and Energy and the Prime Minister’s Office, this report has 
furthermore conducted an interview with Eva Jensen, who was the chief negotiator for the Ministry 
of Climate and Energy during the COP15.  
 
All interviewees are chosen as they played a key role at COP15, and were all key stakeholders. Eva 
Jensen is at the time of writing still employed by the Ministry of Climate and Energy, thus still a 
civil servant. She therefore refused to comment on sensitive political details, such as the internal 
dispute between the Danish Presidency, hence restraining herself from having a free flow in the 
conversation. The interview with Eva Jensen would have been more conducive to our findings, had 
we not taped it or applied quotes within the report.  
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As Eva Jensen was a key participant and stakeholder at the COP15 she was asked to elaborate, as 
far as she could. Off the record we were given a broader insight into the background knowledge of 
the COP15, which has provided us with a much greater understanding of the actual event. But for 
the protection of the source, neither a full transcription nor quotes given off the record will be 
included in this report. 
 
We have in line with Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) conducted semi-structured interviews in order to 
be open-minded to new information, while at the same time having a structure that guides the 
interview (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 43). We prepared an interview guide beforehand, cf. section 
7.1 (page 82), 7.2 (page 84), 7.3 (page 86), which allowed for structuring some overall questions, 
while our interviewees were able to utter their own opinions and observations during the interview. 
Thus, our interviews were less intrusive, as the semi-structured interview encourages two-way 
communication (we refer to section 7.4 and 7.5 for the full transcriptions of the interviews with 
Troels Dam Christensen and Bo Lidegaard). When conducting the interviews, we have been aware, 
that often as a rule, NGOs tend to overstate the influence on negotiations that they have had, while 
delegates tend to underestimate NGO influence (Betsill & Corell 2008: 29). Our data will therefore 
rely heavily on data triangulation, in order to achieve the broadest possible understanding of the 
COP15.  
 
This section should now have provided the reader with an overview of our empirical data. In the 
following section, we wish to present an operationalization of the empirical and theoretical 
framework.  
 
3.4 Operationalization 
Throughout this report we have undertaken a pragmatic approach to critical rationalism. Thus, we 
have perceived theory as a reflection of a synthesis of the empirical evidence, in which we have 
gathered while being confronted with reality. Based on this synthesis, we have managed to extract 
four analytical indicators, which stand as a common thread throughout our theoretical and empirical 
data, when determining NGO influence on international climate negotiations. Thus, we find the 
following four indicators: resources, access, activities and discursive practices, which we will 
define as:  
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3.4.1 Analytical indicators  
 
1. Resources 
The indicator of resources will be defined as a resource, which can be used to further a NGOs 
ability gain access or strengthen its activities. We intend to work with this indicator accordingly 
with the following three terms: 
• Coalition building will include both cooperation with the government and other NGOs.  
• Representation of civil society, which will reflect its support and membership base.  
• Knowledge, which relates to both intelligence on other stakeholders positions and technical 
knowledge.  
 
2. Access 
We intend to define the indicator of access in two different ways. Formal access will be used quite 
narrowly, and will only apply if there is access to the actual negotiations. Informal access will relate 
to any informal channels, in which you could potentially gain access. Informal access can be related 
to access in plenary sessions, working groups and dialogue with states (Betsill 2015: 255).  
However, it is highlighted that having access will not necessarily lead to influence.  
 
3. Activities  
The indicator of activities will be defined as lobbying activities, and will include both inside 
lobbying and outside lobbying. This will be further defined in correlation to the definition set forth 
by Woll (2012), who argues that non-state actors can either try to influence policy makers directly, 
through personal contacts or consultation procedures, or they can seek to influence public opinion 
in order to change the position of policymakers, for example, through media campaigns, lawsuits or 
grassroots strategies. Such indirect influence is referred to as outside lobbying, opposed to the 
inside lobbying of those that have direct access to the policymaker (Woll 2012: 196).  
 
We have furthermore discovered from our interview with Troels Dam Christensen that media 
relations are highlighted as an important activity. Thus, we intend to define media attention from 
Kruse (2012), who claim that NGOs achieve media attention in three distinct ways: 1) interacting 
with journalists, 2) giving journalists insight, and 3) media stunts. 
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4. Discursive practices 
This indicator is derived especially from our interview with Bo Lidegaard, who enhances the 
dispute between the articulated practices between the NGO community and the Prime Minister’s 
Office. The indicator is also touched upon in the empirical data from Lund, who argues, that 
underlying discourses dominates international environmental negotiations (Lund 2013: 742). She 
highlights discourses as being related to norms and values, which are shaping an international 
negotiation. By discourse we do not intend to work with discourse or discourse analysis in a 
traditional sense (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe (1985) or Norman Fairclough (1995)). The term discursive 
practices is only used to coin the indicator, as our empirical material show that language and the 
power of the articulatory practice tended to be of great importance at the COP15. 
 
3.4.2 Analytical strategy 
We have now presented and defined our analytical indicators. This subsection will serve to illustrate 
how we will operationalize the indicators and our hypotheses, while also presenting our analytical 
strategy. First, we intend to operationalize the indicators in accordance with our theoretical 
assumptions, cf. chapter on theory (page 13). Next, when operationalized, these indicators will not 
only function as analytical indicators in determining how NGOs seek to influence the COP15, but 
they will also serve as the analytical strategy.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Putnam 
Hypothesis 1 was derived from the merits of Robert Putnam (1988) and run as follows: NGOs 
pursue influence on international negotiations through domestic polities of states. In order to work 
with this hypothesis in practice, we have derived three theoretical assumptions in order to test the 
explanatory power of this theory. 
 
Government representatives have a monopoly on external representation of the state. In delineating 
this theoretical assumption we will primarily draw upon the indicator of access, as we intend to 
assess whether or not a denial of access was evident.  
 
The principal tool for Level II actors to exploit the two-level game is to influence domestic political 
dynamics.  
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In delineating this theoretical assumption we intend to draw upon all the indicators (resources, 
access, activities, discursive practices), in order to fully assess whether or not this theoretical 
assumption holds any explanatory power in relation to our empirical evidence.  
 
Government representatives are to a large extent responsive to domestic pressure. In delineating this 
final theoretical assumption we intend to primarily draw upon the indicators of access, activities and 
discursive practices.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Risse-Kappen 
Hypothesis 2 was derived from Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) and run as follows: NGOs work 
across boundaries, and seek to influence directly on international negotiations. In order to work 
with this hypothesis in practice, we derive three theoretical assumptions.  
 
In international negotiations government representatives do not have a monopoly on the external 
representation of the state. In delineating this theoretical assumption we will primarily draw upon 
the indicator of access, as we tend to assess whether or not a denial of access was evident. 
 
NGOs can work transnationally in order to gain influence, but they must adjust to the existing 
structures. In delineating this theoretical assumption, we intend to draw upon all the indicators 
(resources, access, activities, discursive practices) in order to fully assess wheater or not this 
theoretical assumption holds any explanatory power in relation to our empirical evidence. 
 
Epistemic communities are an important tool for NGOs to have an impact on international 
negotiations. In delineating this final theoretical assumption we intend to primarily draw upon the 
indicators of resource in relation to knowledge and the indicator of discursive practices.  
 
As this study aims at testing the explanatory power of the above mentioned hypotheses, based on 
two different “less likely” critical case studies, our analytical indictors will help us in the process of 
determining, how NGOs sought to influence the COP15, in the case of the Danish 92 Group. As 
already mentioned, these indicators will work not only as analytical indicators, but they will also 
structure the analysis accordingly.  
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Drawing upon these four analytical indicators, we intend to critically test our hypotheses in the 
strictest manner possible in order to assess which hypothesis has the most explanatory power.  
 
We are however aware that some of the analytical indicators may or may not favour one of the 
hypotheses, as it could be argued that the indicator of resources could potentially favour the 
explanatory of power of hypothesis 1, whereas the indicator of discursive practices could 
potentially favour the explanatory power of hypothesis 2. Furthermore, the four analytical 
indicators are difficult to separate both in reality and in theory. Therefore, we are aware that they 
will overlap at times. However, as a courtesy to the reader, we have chosen to divide them into 
individual indicators in order to provide a more clear structure during the analysis.  
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4.0 Analysis 
In this chapter we seek to analyse to what extent the Danish 92 Group sought to influence the 
COP15 through domestic polities of states, or by working across boundaries in order to gain direct 
influence on the negotiations. The aim of the analysis is to test the robustness of our two hypotheses 
set forth by Robert Putnam (1988) and Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995), and in this sense to answer 
our problem statement.   
 
The analysis will be divided into four sections, which are structured around the indicators that we 
derived from our theoretical and empirical framework. First, the indicator of resources addresses the 
the resources, that the Danish 92 Group possessed and used in order to influence the COP15. 
Second, the indicator of access will examine the access of the Danish 92 Group to the Danish 
Presidency and the COP-negotiations. Thirdly, the indicator of activities will be addressed by 
looking upon both inside and outside lobbying strategies. Finally, the fourth section will address the 
indicator of discursive practices, in order to analyse how certain articulated practices affected the 
relationship between the Danish 92 Group and the Danish Presidency.  
 
Through the analysis we intend to critically test the explanatory power of the two hypotheses by 
applying them to our empirical framework. In the sub conclusion of this chapter, we will seek to 
conclude how robust they proved to be. Following the sub conclusion, we intend to critically reflect 
upon our analytical findings in the section of analytical discussion.  
 
4.1 The indicator of resources       
In this subsection we seek to outline a number of resources possessed and used by the Danish 92 
Group, when trying to influence the COP15. The resources that NGOs possess provide them with 
legitimacy, that is an essential part of their inclusion in the COPs (Pratt 2009: 1, Mitchell 2012: 11). 
As mentioned in chapter on methodology (page 25), this indicator is defined as resources, which 
can be used to further an NGO’s ability gain access or strengthen its activities. This section is 
divided into three subsections, which each address different aspects of resources. First, the strategy 
of the Danish 92 Group in regards to coalition building will be examined. Next, the assessment of 
their representation of civil society, and finally their capacity of knowledge. 
 	 38	
Coalition building 
The ability of NGOs to join forces is often seen as an important mean to affect international 
negotiations. Lund (2013) claims that cooperation increases the influence (Lund 2013: 742). This is 
backed up by studies by Hjerpe & Linner (2010) and Kruse (2012), who also argue that events, 
which gather NGOs, have a significant importance in order to increase coalition building, and align 
positions in relation to the COPs. Thereby, coalition building can be an important resource for 
NGOs. According to Troels Dam Christensen, the Danish 92 Group sought to build coalitions with 
the Danish Presidency, and to strengthen their coalition with international NGOs through the 
transnational network CAN (Interview Christensen: 92). Starting off with the coalition, that was 
sought built between the Danish 92 Group and the Danish government, Christensen argues that 
there was a quite developed dialogue between the two:  
 
”We simply have a tradition in Denmark for having that kind of dialogue between the 
ministries and the NGO community” (Interview Christensen: 93).  
 
However, as mentioned cf. COP15 (page 9), the case of COP15 is quite unique due to the internal 
dispute within the Danish Presidency. The Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Climate and 
Energy had two very different views on which strategy to apply at the COP15. Where the Ministry 
of Climate and Energy was trying to follow the very inclusive UNFCCC procedure, the Prime 
Minister’s Office primarily focused on the big emitters such as China and the US (Interview 
Christensen: 97, Meilstrup 2010). Christensen claims that this affected the ability of the Danish 92 
Group to build a strong coalition with the entire Danish government, as they ended up siding with 
the Ministry of Climate and Energy:  
 
“We agreed with what you could call the Climate Ministry approach that we should still 
try to negotiate through the UN process” (Interview Christensen: 97).  
 
According to Bo Lidegaard, it was clear that the Danish 92 Group had a very different 
understanding of how to reach an agreement at COP15: 
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“The EU and most NGOs, in particular an NGO like the Danish 92 Group, wanted a 
strong agreement in the sense of a legally binding agreement with provisions for 
compliance (…). For us, it was very clear early on that such an agreement could not be 
made. That was a red line for a number of main parties, including US, China and India 
(Interview Lidegaard: 112-113).  
 
Following the logic from hypothesis 1, set forth by Putnam, these red lines, which Lidegaard refers 
to, can be seen as win-sets. As mentioned in the chapter on theory (page 13), win-sets are a set of all 
Level I agreements, which would be able to gain the necessary support among Level II actors. Thus, 
it is the negotiation room, in which the government representatives have to navigate in. In the view 
of Lidegaard, the Danish 92 Group did not understand the importance of these win-sets, which 
made their cooperation difficult.   
 
Thereby, the Danish 92 Group ended up having a stronger coalition with the Ministry of Climate 
and Energy than with the Prime Minister’s Office during the COP15, as they had a similar 
understanding of the negotiation strategy. This is confirmed by Eva Jensen, who states that the 
Ministry of Climate and Energy had a good cooperation with the Danish 92 Group (Interview 
Jensen). Contrary to this, Lidegaard states that he had “some pretty tough exchanges” with the 
leaders of the Danish NGO Group, and that this affected their cooperation (Interview Lidegaard: 
115).  
 
Several scholars argue that it is essential for NGOs to be able to build coalitions with governments, 
when trying to pursue influence at international negotiations (Downie 2014: 381, Lund 2013: 742). 
Thereby, the weakened relationship with parts of the Danish government could be seen as a clear 
disadvantage, in order for the Danish 92 Group to be successful in the strategies they applied at 
COP15. But the fact that the Danish 92 Group sought to build coalitions with the Danish Presidency 
seems to strengthen the explanatory power of hypothesis 1, as the Danish 92 Group sought to 
exploit the two-level game by influencing domestic political dynamics.  
 
However, the Danish 92 Group furthermore sought to strengthen their coalition with the 
transnational network CAN, as they perceived it as important for Danish NGOs and international 
NGOs to team up in order to influence COP15 (Interview Christensen: 106).  
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Christensen describes the cooperation between the Danish 92 Group and CAN as very close during 
the COP15. Furthermore, he adds that the level of ambition of the Danish 92 Group to a large extent 
was defined by CAN, as they sought to align their positions (Interview Christensen: 102). While 
hypothesis 1 does not bring any explanatory power to transnational factors, hypothesis 2 does seem 
to be strengthened with regard to this empirical evidence. This is seen, as Risse-Kappen emphasises 
that transnational coalitions can become successful in influencing international negotiations, if they 
manage to persuade or line up with domestic and governmental actors in the targeted country. Thus, 
it seems that the Danish 92 Group managed to use their coalition with CAN in order to influence 
the COP15 directly:  
 
“The fact that they (Denmark ed.) had the Presidency also meant that the international 
NGO community was very interested in also influencing them (Denmark ed.), and in 
that sense we were an important middleman in that situation. So CAN, for example, 
would work with us to influence the Danish government” (Interview Christensen: 92). 
 
During COP15, the Danish 92 Group was included in the top coordination of CAN, since they were 
representatives from the country of the Presidency (Interview Christensen: 101). In the view of 
Christensen, the Danish 92 Group gained influence by working with CAN (Interview Christensen: 
106). In general, he states that NGOs are taken more seriously if they join forces, both at the 
national and international level.  
 
“The fact that we actually have a relatively coordinated international network means 
that you have qualified positions, you have qualified work, which means you have 
stronger influence.” (Interview Christensen: 106) 
 
From the above, it can be argued that the strong coalition between the Danish 92 Group and CAN 
does portray a pursuit to work across boundaries, thus strengthening hypothesis 2. However, as 
hypothesis 1 does not take transnational forces into account, it is difficult to conclude whether or 
not this transnational force were to influence the negotiations directly, or simply exploit the two 
level game through transnational forces.  
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The representation of civil society 
NGOs are by many observers perceived as representatives of civil society (UNFCCC 1992, Rietig 
2011: 30, Clark et al. 1998, Interview Lidegaard: 115). The Danish 92 Group represents 587.175 
people in Denmark throughout their 23 members, as shown by this table2: 
 
Members of the Danish 92 Group  Membership 
Afrika Kontakt 982 
Amnesty International Denmark 86.000 
Care 13.000 
Danmarks Naturfredningsforening 125.000 
Dansk International Bosætningsservice 60 
Dansk Ornitologisk Forening 16.000 
Det Økologiske Råd 1.000 
Danish United Nations Associations 350 
Folkekirkens Nødhjælp - Act Alliance Denmark 55.000 
Greenpeace 25.000 
Natur og Ungdom 23 
Sex og Samfund 1.000 
Røde Kors Danmark 200.000 
WWF 20.000 
Verdens Skove 1.891 
Vedvarende energi 1.900 
U-landsforeningen Svalerne 300 
																																																								
2 The data is collected by phone call to the respective organisations. However, we do acknowledge that some members 
may or may not be a member of more than one organisation, thus the memberships may not provide a full picture of the 
level of representation of the civil society.  
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Landsforeningen for Økosamfund 126 
Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke 25.000 
IWGIA 1.000 
Kvindernes U-Landsudvalg Umbrella Group 
Øko-Net 4.543 
IBIS 9.000 
Total memberships 587.175 
Table 1: The members of the Danish 92 Group 
 
The number of members can be seen as an important resource for NGOs, as it indicates how big of 
a part of the civil society, they can claim to represent. According to Lidegaard, it is important for 
governments to involve the civil society in the climate negotiations: 
 
“(…) The climate negotiations are really about creating dynamics and cooperative 
structures between countries and other forces in society towards ever increasing 
reductions. Therefore, including civil society in the discussion is one of the 
preconditions for arriving at an agreement (…)” (Interview Lidegaard: 115).  
 
Thereby, the ability to represent the civil society can be seen as a resource for NGOs. However, 
according to Lidegaard, an elected government always has to be responsive to its voters. In his 
view, the Danish Presidency was very aware of the fact that the Danish environmental NGOs only 
covered a limited range of voters: 
 
“I think they (politicians ed.) look very much at what their voters say, and it may well 
be that the voters are not in agreement with that one percent or less that is actually 
NGOs.” (Interview Lidegaard: 122).  
 
While representation of the civil society, and hereunder the voters of the government in power, can 
be a valuable resource for NGOs, Lidegaard emphasises that if NGOs does not manage to represent 
a greater part of the civil society it has a very little effect:  
 	 43	
“You have to understand that a negotiation is not a forum, in which everyone has an 
equal voice. It is a room, where you try to hammer out a hard bargain between countries, 
which have real interests at stake, and they are represented not by their NGOs but by 
their governments” (Interview Lidegaard: 120-121).   
 
It could be argued, that the statements set forth by Lidegaard provides hypothesis 1 with a certain 
degree of explanatory power, as the states are the dominating factor. Thus, states and their 
representatives becomes the primary actor at COP15 by having a monopoly on the external 
representation of the state. As hypothesis 1 denotes, government representatives are to a large 
extent responsive to domestic pressure, but the empirical data suggests that they do not bother 
engaging with the civil society if they do not represent their own domestic pressure, ergo the voters.  
  
Knowledge 
Turning to knowledge as the last resource, it is important to differentiate between knowledge as 
intelligence of NGO and state positions and as technical knowledge. In regard to both 
understandings, Kanie (2013) claims that NGOs often possess more or at least a different 
knowledge than states, which can be important at international negotiations (Kanie 2013: 178). In 
the case of the Danish 92 Group, this kind of knowledge was very much related to the fact that they 
could provide information to the government about the international NGO community (Interview 
Christensen: 94). According to Christensen:  
 
”There is a tradition of listening to the NGOs and exchanging viewpoints, but also to 
learn from each other. That is a part of it. They learn what is going on in the NGO 
camp, and we can learn what is going on in the EU for example”  
(Interview Christensen: 94).  
 
This is further supported by Jensen, who states that the Danish government used the knowledge of 
the Danish 92 Group as intelligence of other state positions (Interview Jensen). This exchange was 
especially evident in the run-up to the COP15, as the Danish government ”was very interested in 
knowing what was going on in the different stakeholder camps” (Interview Christensen: 94). 
Lidegaard confirms that this kind of knowledge was of interest to the Danish government in their 
attempt to seek out the positions of all the important actors (Interview Lidegaard: 112).  
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This was further elaborated by Jensen, who states that one of the main resources of the Danish 92 
Group was the knowledge extracted from their international network:  
 
“Another advantage of the green NGOs is that they have an international network, and 
that they are often quite well informed. So the Danish green NGOs usually have good 
intelligence on things like the Chinese position or the Brazilian position and so on” 
(Interview Jensen).  
 
Hence, based on the findings in the section on coalition building, it could be argued that the 
international NGOs and the Danish 92 Group managed to create an epistemic community, as they 
were able to draw upon knowledge from each other, and potentially strategically use this to change 
the state interests in a desired direction. The knowledge of the Danish 92 Group derived from their 
international partners was acknowledged and utilised by the Danish government. This seems to 
provide the assumptions in hypothesis 2 with a degree of explanatory power, as it emphasises the 
strength of epistemic communities.  
 
According to Lidegaard, if an NGO wish to pursue influence at an international negotiation it must 
bring something to the table: “It is obvious that if you make yourself relevant, you are closer to the 
process” (Interview Lidegaard, 124). Therefore, it could be argued that by working through 
transnational coalitions the Danish 92 Group increased their knowledge, which was a resource they 
could utilise towards the government representatives. Through the creation of an epistemic 
community the Danish 92 Group and CAN were able to increase their knowledge-resource. Thus, 
the assumptions based on hypothesis 2, which hold that NGOs can work transnationally in order to 
gain influence, seem to be strengthened.  
 
Moving on to technical knowledge, Lund argues that the highly technical nature of international 
climate negotiations like the COP15 implies that NGOs, who possess a high level of specific 
knowledge, has a better chance of influencing the negotiations (Lund 2013: 741). Christensen 
claims, that the Danish 92 Group had different information channels including technical knowledge, 
which he considers to have been a valuable resource in the dialogue with the Danish Presidency 
(Interview Christensen: 99):  
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”They (The Prime Minister’s Office ed.) were interested in having intelligence from us, 
and we were also in our group recruiting really strong, respected advocates from the 
science sector and so on.  For that reason, they were also interested in listening to us.” 
(Interview Christensen: 99).  
 
However, this is not confirmed by Lidegaard, who argues that the Danish NGOs did not manage to 
provide the Prime Minister’s Office with important technical knowledge (interview Lidegaard 123). 
This is supported by Jensen, who claims that she hardly experienced receiving technical knowledge 
from the Danish 92 Group (Interview, Jensen). Lidegaard even states, that he felt that it was mostly 
international NGO networks, that understood to use this resource: 
 
“I must say, that those who provided most knowledge were some of the huge 
internationals (NGOs ed.) (…). Generally, I found most of the international NGOs 
much more focused on substance, and the Danish groups much more focused on 
formalities (...). I think they completely missed the point”  
(Interview Lidegaard: 115,123).  
 
According to Lidegaard, the international NGOs managed to utilise their technical knowledge as a 
resource, which was highly useful for the Danish Presidency, not let alone for the Prime Minister’s 
Office. Lidegaard uses the World Resources Institute and Project Catalyst as examples of NGOs 
that created and shared valuable knowledge with states, and thereby became influential. He 
emphasises that Project Catalyst managed to create an epistemic community by setting up joints all 
over the world offering government representatives calculations and figures on the benefits of 
reducing emissions:  
 
“(…) And most countries accepted that offer, which of course gave Project Catalyst a 
lot of information about the Chinese energy sector etc. So they increased their 
knowledge to a very high level, which made them useful for us “  
(Interview Lidegaard: 124).  
 
By only looking at the international NGOs these findings seem to weaken hypothesis 1, as 
international NGOs gained influence by acting transnationally as an epistemic community.  
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Thus, Project Catalyst managed to pursue a strategy in accordance with hypothesis 2, as they were 
able to influence directly on the negotiations by becoming a valuable resource to not only the 
Danish government representatives, but among almost all government representatives (Interview 
Lidegaard: 124). Furthermore, as exemplified by the quote above, Project Catalyst managed to 
utilise their technical knowledge into gaining intelligence, thus gaining an even greater knowledge-
resource. This seems to weaken hypothesis 1, which assumes that NGOs gain influence by 
exploiting the two-level game through domestic pressure. On the contrary, it seems that the Danish 
92 Group pursued a strategy related to hypothesis 1. It is furthermore indicated that this strategy 
was less successful in relation to gaining influence. This suggests that while the Danish 92 Group 
might have possessed a resource of technical knowledge, they were unable to use it in order to gain 
influence at the COP15.  
 
Thus, the strategy pursued by the international NGOs in relation to hypothesis 2 might have enabled 
them to pursue more influence at the negotiations. However, this is not confirmed by Jensen, who 
claims that neither the Danish 92 Group nor the international NGOs provided any meaningful 
technical knowledge. However, according to Meilstrup the Ministry of Climate and Energy did 
possess a considerable degree of technical knowledge, wherefore it could argued that what 
Lidegaard experienced as valuable technical knowledge, might not have been as valuable to the 
Ministry of Climate and Energy (Meilstrup 2010: 62).  
 
Sum up 
From the above, it has become evident that the Danish 92 Group primarily used their resources to 
seek influence at COP15 through the Danish Presidency. Thereby, it can be argued that hypothesis 
1 has significant explanatory power, as most of the resources of the Danish 92 Group were used to 
influence domestic political dynamics. However, there are some areas, in which hypothesis 1 lacks 
explanatory power. Thus, in the cases of the close cooperation between CAN and the Danish 92 
Group, and the ability of the international NGOs to collaborate with the representatives from the 
Convention to the COP, are best explained by hypothesis 2.  
4.2 The indicator of access 
In this section we intend to outline the possibilities and limits for the Danish 92 Group to get access 
to the negotiations before and during COP15.  
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We intend to define the indicator of access by distinguishing between formal access and informal 
access. In this report, formal access should only be understood as direct access to the actual 
negotiations, whereas informal access will relate to any informal channels, where you could 
potentially get access. Thus, informal access can be related to access in plenary sessions, working 
groups and dialogue with states (Betsill 2015: 255). Furthermore, it is highlighted that having 
access will not necessarily lead to influence. 
 
The section will begin with an investigation of the general possibilities for NGOs to get access to 
the COP15 in relation to the UNFCCC rules. Next, the access of the Danish 92 Group to the Danish 
Presidency will be addressed, followed by an examination of their ability to get access through the 
international network CAN. 
 
Formal and informal access 
The COP-negotiations have from the very beginning been inclusive of NGOs, and have sought to 
involve them as an important part of the solutions to climate changes (Lund 2013: 743; Kruse 2012: 
1; Agenda 21). This is clearly shown in the very broad definition of who is able to access the COPs, 
which is included in the UNFCCC: 
 
“Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-
governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has 
informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of 
the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties 
present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules 
of procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties” (UNFCCC 1992).  
 
Thus, according to the Convention, the possibility to access the COP15 as an observer should be 
relatively easy for most NGOs. Caniglia et al. (2015) claims that NGOs mostly get informal access 
(Caniglia et al. 2015: 242), which is in accordance with the access to the COP15. The NGOs were 
given access to the COP through plenary sessions, working groups and dialogue with states, but 
were often excluded from most of the actual negotiations between the states (Betsill 2015: 255). 
This is further explained by Christensen, who outlines the process this way:  
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“In the UN negotiations, with the Rio Conventions, is that you can often get access to at 
least the starting situation. These negotiations can go on in quite open rooms, going into 
smaller and smaller rooms. At a certain point, the NGOs are asked to leave the room 
(…)” (Interview Christensen: 107).  
 
This process obviously depicts a denial of access, as NGOs, like the Danish 92 Group, were not 
allowed to engage directly at the negotiations, while their access to a large extent was restricted to 
meetings with delegations (Caniglia et al. 2015: 242, Interview Lidegaard: 120-121, Interview 
Christensen: 107).  
 
As the NGOs are only granted with observer status it becomes evident that the Convention 
emphasises the role of government representatives as the external representation of the state. Thus, 
the access granted to NGOs by the UNFCCC does seem to provide explanatory power to hypothesis 
1. This further strengthens the assumption of hypothesis 1, which holds that government 
representatives have a monopoly on the external representation of the state. Likewise, it seems to 
weaken the assumptions in hypothesis 2, which argues the reverse.  
 
As stated in the indicator of resources, NGOs were excluded from the Danish delegation at the 
COP15. This included the Danish 92 Group, as the Danish government wanted to delimit the 
confusion of who represented the Danish state (Interview Christensen: 107). Thus, the level of 
formal access of the Danish 92 Group decreased in comparison to previous COPs, as they had 
previously enjoyed a privileged position among Danish NGOs by being a part of the Danish 
delegation (Interview Christensen: 107, Kanie 2013: 180-181).  
 
Kanie (2013) claims that NGOs, who are a part of a delegation, improve their chances of 
influencing the negotiations significantly (Kanie 2013: 180-181). According to Kanie, the positions 
of the Danish 92 Group and the Danish government were very often in convergence during the time, 
where they were a part of the delegation. It can be seen from the fact that up until 2001, 90 percent 
of the positions of the Danish government were reflected in the position papers of the Danish 92 
Group (Kanie 2013: 180-181). Therefore, it seems that the level of access, and thus the possibility 
to gain influence, decreased for the Danish 92 Group at the COP15 after they were excluded from 
the delegation.  
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Furthermore, the possibility for the government to simply exclude the Danish 92 Group from the 
Danish delegation clearly underlines their monopoly on external representation of the state at the 
COP-negotiations, which seem to provide explanatory power to hypothesis 1.  
 
Access to the Danish Presidency 
The Danish Presidency at the COP15 did to a large extent seek to include and allow access for the 
Danish NGOs (Meilstrup 2010: 30). This is supported by Christensen, Lidegaard and Jensen, who 
all state that there were regular meeting between the Danish 92 Group and the Presidency 
(Interview Christensen: 107; Interview Lidegaard: 112; Interview Jensen). This indicates that the 
Danish 92 Group had access to the government. According to hypothesis 1, this suggests that the 
Danish government sought to get an understanding of the domestic win-set. By including Danish 
NGOs in the process, the Danish Presidency was able to gain knowledge of the preferences of the 
civil society, and thereby get an idea of the size of their win-set. Furthermore, the assumptions set 
forth in hypothesis 1 denotes that the government representatives are expected to be responsive to 
domestic pressure. Thereby, the wish for the government to understand the domestic win-set might 
give Danish NGOs, such as the Danish 92 Group, the possibility to influence. 
 
In addition to this, Lidegaard states that the Danish government had no formal rules for which 
NGOs to cooperate with: 
 
“Basically when we invited to briefings, we invited all the major NGOs and all the 
active NGOs (…). We would cooperate with anyone who had a contribution”  
(Interview Lidegaard: 116). 
 
Thus, the Danish 92 Group had informal access to the Presidency. This informal access, together 
with their historical ties with the Danish delegation, could indicate, that the Danish 92 Group 
managed to create personal relations with the Danish government. This is important for NGOs in 
order to get access and possibly influence (Kanie 2013: 182-183; Interview Jensen). The 
importance of personal relations is also confirmed by Jensen, who argues:  
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“There are always people you get to know well, who you know is reliable, and clever 
and so on. So there will always be some of the NGOs, that you trust more than others” 
(Interview Jensen).  
 
As previously mentioned, access does not necessarily lead to influence. But the coalition between 
the Ministry of Climate and Energy and the Danish 92 Group does seem to suggest that they had 
closer personal ties and thus possibly a greater informal access.  
 
Access through transnational networks 
It can be difficult for an NGO like the Danish 92 Group to get access to other government 
representatives, wherefore Christensen claims that they often circumvented this lack of access by 
working through their transnational network CAN (Interview Christensen: 109). According to 
Christensen, CAN has the capacity to organise meetings between NGOs and governments. This was 
done by creating NGO working groups, which had the capacity to access different state delegations: 
 
“CAN has like 15-20 different working groups on different subjects (…). If you have a 
meeting with a delegation – and it is an international meeting – then the head of that 
working group needs to be there. Sometimes, you are a part of that also. There, we 
would meet ministers and so on “ (Interview Christensen: 109). 
 
As indicated by this, the Danish 92 Group used the CAN network to get more access to the foreign 
delegates at the COP15, as their own capacity was inadequate. This underlines how the CAN 
network, through their capacity as an international network, became an instrument for the Danish 
92 Group to increase their level of access to the COP15 negotiations. These working groups gave 
the NGOs access to advocate their positions to COP15 participants, and thereby potentially to have 
their issues on the global environmental agenda (Hjerpe & Linnér 2010, Schroeder & Lovell 2011).  
 
Furthermore, it gave them access to prominent ministers, whereas most of their own interaction was 
with civil servants (Christensen 2015: 108). Based on these empirical findings, and the fact that the 
Danish 92 Group was able to use CAN, in order to gain access to foreign delegations provides a 
high degree of explanatory power to hypothesis 2, as they were able to use transnational forces to 
influence the negotiations directly.  
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Thus, hypothesis 1 set forth by Putnam does lack some explanatory power in this area, as Putnam 
does claims that the principle tool for NGOs in to influence on domestic political dynamics.  
 
Sum up 
From the above, it has become evident that the basic structure of the COP is characterized by a 
denial of formal access of NGOs. Although, they are granted with observer status, the COP 
emphasises the government representatives as having a monopoly on state representation. This 
seems to provide explanatory power to hypothesis 1. Furthermore, the fact that the Danish 92 Group 
had a high level of access to the Danish Presidency can to some extent be explained by the notion of 
win-sets set forth by hypothesis 1. However, the hypothesis does fall short in explaining how the 
Danish 92 Group was provided with access to foreign delegates through the network of CAN, 
which seem to strengthen the explanatory power of hypothesis 2.  
 
4.3 The indicator of activities     
This subsection seeks to examine which activities the Danish 92 Group pursued in order to 
influence the COP15. As Betzold (2013) argues, NGOs have to use their strategies strategically in 
order to use them effectively (Betzold 2013: 1-2). Therefore, NGOs tend to draw upon a variety of 
strategies relating to activities. As noted in the chapter on methodology (page 25), the indicator of 
activities will be defined as lobbying activities and include both inside lobbying and outside 
lobbying. This section will start by examining the inside lobbying strategies pursued by the Danish 
92 Group. Subsequently, we will be analysing outside lobbying strategies. This section will draw 
upon three terms in relation to media attention: 1) the interaction with journalists, 2) providing 
journalists with insight, and 3) media stunts. 
 
Inside lobbying 
In order to pursue influence at the COP15, the Danish 92 Group pursued a variety of strategies 
related to inside lobbying. As mentioned, inside lobbying has in this report been defined as those 
activities, which allow for direct access to the policymakers such as personal contacts or 
consultation procedures. The advocacy work of the Danish 92 Group started a couple of years prior 
to COP15 (Christensen 2015: 92).  
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As previously referred to, the Danish 92 Group had been a part of the Danish delegation at previous 
UN meetings, but was denied this position at the COP15 (Kanie 2013: 180-181, Interview 
Christensen: 107). Thus, the Danish 92 Group was compensated at the COP15, as they were given 
regular meetings with the Danish government (Interview Christensen: 107). This is exemplified by 
Lidegaard, who states: 
 
“We had a close collaboration in the sense that we were briefing them on a regular 
basis, both during the consultations and the negotiations. A month ahead of the 
negotiations we were meeting with them on a regular basis.  So did the Ministry of 
Climate, the Prime Minister's Office, and myself ” (Interview Lidegaard: 112).  
 
According to Christensen, the main focus for the strategies of inside lobbying was the Danish 
government: 
 
“We were, as we are today, focusing on the Danish government. We were focusing on 
lobbying and advocating our viewpoints towards the government. So we had quite an 
intense dialog with them (...)” (Interview Christensen: 92).  
 
This seems to indicate that hypothesis 1 has explanatory power in this regard, as the Danish 92 
Group pursued a strategy where their main focus was to create domestic pressure by lobbying the 
Danish government. Furthermore, it could be argued from the following quote, that the Ministry of 
Climate and Energy was, to some extent, responsive to domestic pressure, as Jensen argues:  
 
“(…) When you have good discussions with someone you might realise that they 
(Danish NGOs ed.) have a good solution. So sometimes they would come up with some 
good solutions” (Interview Jensen).  
 
This seems to indicate that the Danish 92 Group did manage to pursue inside lobbying towards the 
Danish government. This appears to strengthen hypothesis 1, as they had a strategy of trying to 
exploit the two-level games in order to influence domestic political dynamics.  
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It is furthermore stated by Lidegaard that foreign NGOs such as the World Resources Institute and 
Project Catalyst also applied a strategy of inside lobbying towards the Danish Presidency:  
 
“In general, I felt that they had a better understanding of the reality of the 
negotiation (…). They (World Resources Institute ed.) knew for a fact there was 
not one member of the American Congress, let alone any member of the 
administration, that would ever dream of signing anything like what Europe asked 
for. They did not waste their time discussing whether there should be a legally 
binding treaty” (Interview Lidegaard: 119).  
 
Following the logic of hypothesis 1 set forth by Putnam the international NGOs appeared to be 
more aware of the risk of involuntary defection, which is a result of negotiators being unable to 
ratify an agreement domestically, cf. chapter on theory (page 13). Thus, they were more aware of 
the red lines, or win-sets, within the COP15, which made them turn to a different strategy. 
However, the strategy they turned to gives more explanatory power to hypothesis 2:  
 
“The international NGOs succeeded more in cooperating, because they figured out ways 
of addressing the issue, rather than mobilizing political will. Politicians respond to their 
constituencies, whether they are democratically elected or not. They do not respond to 
NGOs from a different country, who have an opinion far from their political will” 
(Interview Lidegaard: 118).  
 
According to hypothesis 2, NGOs are only able to have an impact on policy in their targeted 
countries if they overcome two hurdles. The first is to get access to the political system, and the 
second is to build so-called winning coalitions, which are characterised by their ability to change 
policies in a desired direction. As international NGOs managed to use their epistemic communities 
to get access to the political systems in the different Parties of the Convention, they overcame the 
first hurdle. They furthermore sought to overcome the second hurdle by trying to establish winnings 
coalitions with government representatives. As Lidegaard clearly states that both the Project 
Catalyst and World Resources Institute proved successful in their strategies, it could be argued they 
managed to build winning coalitions. Thereby, hypothesis 2 is strengthened, as it can be said to 
have explanatory power in the case of international NGOs.  
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International NGOs such as Project Catalyst or World Resources Institute would thereby seek to 
influence the climate negotiations directly through their networks of knowledge sharing, thus 
providing hypothesis 2 with explanatory power. Although it becomes quite evident that the Danish 
92 Group did pursue a strategy relating to Hypothesis 1, the international NGOs did manage to 
pursue strategies relating to an epistemic community, and thereby influence the COP15 directly.  
 
Outside lobbying 
The strategy of outside lobbying seeks to influence public opinion in order to change the position of 
policymakers, for example through media campaigns, lawsuits or grassroots strategies. Such 
indirect influence is referred to as outside lobbying. The Danish 92 Group pursued an array of 
strategies related to outside lobbying in regards to media relations and activist strategies such as 
demonstrations. Christensen states that “a large part of what we did under COP15 was briefing the 
press (…)” (Interview Christensen: 91). Thus, Christensen argues that media relations was a 
strategy, which was widely pursued by the Danish 92 Group. Furthermore, this interaction with 
journalists provided them with a powerful tool for strategic purposes:  
 
“This (the press, ed.) is something that often politicians are really worried about. 
Sometimes you will meet civil servants, who say: “Well, I do not care if you are going 
to talk to journalists about that”, but if you talk with their minister he will be really 
worried about it. That is of course also a power position, but that is in a situation where 
you have a kind of power relationship” (Interview Christensen: 95).  
 
According to Kruse (2012), NGOs can achieve media attention through three different measures: 1) 
interacting with journalists, 2) giving them insight, and 3) media stunts. In relation to the first point 
of interaction with journalists, Christensen confirms that they had significant interaction with 
journalists, as the Danish Presidency was not too interested in briefing the press (Interview 
Lidegaard: 125, Interview Christensen: 100). Therefore, the press was briefed regularly by the 
Danish 92 Group (Interview Christensen: 91).  Christensen e.g. points to the fact that he often 
contacted the media in relation to an issue “trying to explain to the press that they should focus on 
this (...)” (Christensen 2015:XX). This is supported by Jensen, who argues that the Danish 92 
Group was very good at shaping the media focus, and that they were very good at “(...) asking the 
right questions in the press” (Interview Jensen). 
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The second point of media relations, set forth by Kruse, relates to providing the media with insight 
from the negotiations. As the NGOs had better access to the COP15 than the press, they had a better 
understanding of the important issues in the negotiations:  
 
“We did a lot of briefings. Because the journalists would come to us and ask: “what is 
going on at the negotiations? Because, as you know, the negotiations are not open to the 
press” (Interview Christensen: 100).  
 
Drawing upon the last measure of media relations set forth by Kruse, which denotes media stunts, 
the Danish 92 Group participated in the “Fossil of the Day”-events. During the COP-negotiations, 
members of CAN voted for the countries that were judged to have done their 'best' to block progress 
in the negotiations (CAN c, Interview Christensen: 98, Betsill & Corell 2008: 23). This is 
recognised as a media stunt by Christensen, who claims that it is done in order to put pressure on 
states to improve their climate policies (Interview Christensen: 98).  
 
A further point not covered by Kruse was the publication of CAN’s newspaper ECO during the 
COPs, and they targeted Denmark on a few occasions during COP15. This was done with the 
intention of criticising the Danish Presidency and promoting a more transparent negotiation strategy 
(ECO 9-12-09). On this note, Christensen states that the Danish 92 Group made it clear to CAN that 
they should target their criticism towards the Prime Minister’s Office and not to the Ministry of 
Climate and Energy (Christensen 2015: 98). This further serves to illustrate the coalition between 
the Ministry of Climate and Energy and the Danish 92 Group. This is also recognized by Jensen, 
who states that “it is always an advantage that someone in the press would share the same ideas 
and positions as a ministry does” (Interview Jensen).  
 
This empirical evidence seems to provide explanatory power to hypothesis 1, as the Danish 92 
Group was highly focused on mobilizing the domestic forces through the press in order to pressure 
the Danish Presidency during the COP15. Furthermore, the media strategies chosen by the Danish 
92 Group seems to find explanatory power in hypothesis 1, as they are build on the assumption that 
government representatives would be expected to respond to domestic pressure.  
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From the above, it is evident that the Danish 92 Group did perceive the media as an important tool 
to pressure, influence or bargain with the government representatives at the COP15. Christensen 
furthermore states:  
 
“Up to COP15 the stakes were much higher for the Danish government, because 
the world public were looking at what they were doing. So of course they would be 
much more sensitive to bad press coverage” (Interview Christensen: 96).  
 
However, this line of argument is not confirmed by Lidegaard, who argues that the Danish 
government representatives did not fear the power of the press during the negotiations at COP15:  
 
“We were more preoccupied with trying to find an agreement (…). For us, it would 
have been a lot easier with much better press, but our ambition was actually to get the 
main parties to conceive of a common approach, and that is actually what we succeeded 
in doing, which we knew would give us very bad press” (Interview Lidegaard: 126).  
 
In this sense Lidegaard argues that the press as a strategic tool did not influence the negotiations at 
COP15. As seen from this, the strategy of outside lobbying might have been widely used by the 
Danish 92 Group, but does not seem to have provided them with significant influence. This is even 
more evident when turning to the second strategy of outside lobbying: demonstrations. Lidegaard 
quite firmly suggests that this strategy was unsettling, as ”their activism in the streets was 
completely a waste of time” (Interview Lidegaard: page 118). This argument is supported by a study 
conducted by Katharina Rietig (2011), who claims that most of the countries at COP15 found 
demonstrations disturbing (Rietig 2011: 23-24). At COP15 several demonstrations were arranged 
gathering between 50,000 to 100,000 people (Wahlström et al. 2013: 4-5). A large amount of NGOs 
were behind the demonstrations at COP15, and organisations from more than 67 countries 
participated (Wahlström et al. 2013: 4-5).  
 
However, this strategy of outside lobbying through mass demonstrations appears to have been 
applied by primarily transnational actors. Not only were they to a great extent arranged by 
transnational organisations, but they were also attended by a great amount of transnational actors.  
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This is exemplified by a survey done by Wahlström et al. (2013), which shows that only 51 % of 
the participants at the demonstrations at COP15 were Danish citizens, whereas the rest were 
foreigners (Wahlström et al. 2013: 4-5). This seem to provide hypothesis 2 with explanatory power, 
as the strategy of outside lobbying was directed at the COP as a venue and not directed at a certain 
domestic level. Although, some scholars find demonstrations to be an important strategy for NGOs 
to create awareness of an issue (Wahlström et al. 2013; Rietig 2011), it is plainly suggested by 
Lidegaard that they do not matter. As seen in the section of resources and civil society, Lidegaard 
suggest that the strategy of demonstrations is not efficient by any means, as politicians in reality 
only care about voters. And, in his view, NGOs does not manage to cover the range of voters, 
which politicians listens to (Interview Lidegaard: 122). Thus, from this empirical data this seems to 
support hypothesis 1, as it assumes the principal tool to influence negotiations is through domestic 
political dynamics.  
 
Sum up 
As examined in this section, the Danish Presidency was the main target of the inside as well as 
outside lobbying strategies by the Danish 92 Group. This seems to strengthen the explanatory 
power of hypothesis 1. However, the empirical data showed that international NGOs managed to 
build winning coalitions with representatives of Parties to the Convention by acting through an 
epistemic community. This seems to weaken hypothesis 1, as hypothesis 2 provides more 
explanatory power to this specific evidence.  
 
4.4 The indicator of discursive practices  
In this subsection we will seek to examine how and which articulatory practices dominated the 
relationship between the Danish 92 Group and the Danish Presidency, as our data seems to suggest 
these dominated the negotiations at COP15.  As mentioned in the chapter of methodology (page 25), 
the indicator of discursive practices will relate to the underlying discourses influencing the COP15.    
 
As already mentioned, this indicator is primarily derived from our interview with Lidegaard, as he 
enhances the dispute between the articulated practices of the NGO community and the Danish 
Presidency.  
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The fundamental goal of COP15 appears to have been evident for Christensen, Lidegaard and 
Jensen, as all of them felt they pursued an ambitious agreement (Christensen 2015: 91, Lidegaard 
2015: 111, Jensen 2015). Nonetheless, there seems to be fundamental differences in the way they 
perceived an ambitious agreement, and how it should be attained. According to Lidegaard, the 
NGOs kept criticising the government for not pursing an ambitious agreement:  
 
“That is a very typical NGO reaction: “too ambitious”, meaning the way we do it in the 
EU is the right way, and the ambitious way, and everyone else are wrong. So if you do 
not agree with us, it is because you are not ambitious (...) But to us, it became obvious 
that if we wanted a strong and ambitious agreement the focus on the legal aspects were 
probably the worst place to start (...)” (Lidegaard 2015: 113).  
 
Thus, he argues that the ambition of the Danish 92 Group of reaching a legally binding agreement 
was unrealistic. Drawing upon the subsection on the indicator of resources, Lidegaard seems to find 
that the Danish 92 Group did not understand the red lines in the negotiations, which blurred their 
focus. As the NGOs kept focusing on reaching the goal of a binding agreement, they became unable 
to understand the “language”, which was spoken in the Prime Minister's Office. Thereby, according 
to Lidegaard, the Danish 92 Group and the Prime Minister’s Office had two different 
understandings of the definition of an ambitious agreement, hence two different strategies: 
 
”I think the NGOs to a large part focused on the wrong goal. The climate is not saved 
by a legal text. The climate is about reducing emissions, and if you get too obsessed 
with legality or formality, you may actually be less ambitious”  
(Interview Lidegaard: 121). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Danish 92 Group found, that the Danish Presidency should follow the 
traditional UNFCCC track of including all countries in the negotiations, while the Prime Minister’s 
Office pursued a strategy that mostly focused on the major emitters (Interview Christensen: 97, 
Interview Lidegaard: 114). In the view of Christensen, the UN process “is difficult, and it might be 
really irritating sometimes, but it is the only way you can do it” (Interview Christensen: 97). 
Thereby, the Danish 92 Group and the Danish Presidency were very far apart in their opinion on 
how to reach an agreement.  
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In line with Christensen, Lidegaard argues that the Danish 92 Group had different values at the 
negotiation, as they applied an articulatory practice relating to legal formalities and a negotiation 
process of including all countries. In comparison, the Prime Minister’s Office gave up on the idea 
of a binding agreement several months before COP15, and focused more on negotiating the red 
lines between the big emitters (Lidegaard 2015: 114, Meilstrup 2010: 105-106). Thus, it could be 
argued that the two sides applied two very different articulatory practices in regard to reaching an 
agreement.  
 
Lund argues that underlying discourses dominates international environmental negotiations (Lund 
2013: 742). Thus, she highlights discourses as being related to norms and values, which are shaping 
an international negotiation. The level of coherence between the NGO position and the existing 
norms plays a significant role in how well perceived the NGO arguments are met by the other actors 
(Lund 2013: 743-44). Thus, the articulatory practice becomes quite important in diplomatic settings, 
and it seems as if the norms and values, which the Danish 92 Group were trying to articulate, were 
not met by the Prime Minister’s Office. 
 
“I was not impressed by the way they (The Danish 92 Group, ed.) approached it, 
because they had this basic approach that we need to put pressure on politicians, and 
they were constantly ”putting pressure”, as they termed it, on us to put pressure on 
everyone else. The idea that Denmark could put pressure on China or the US is basically 
ridiculous. It was one of the discussions I often had with them: get off my back with this 
idea of pressure. We do not build up pressure on Obama. (…). The idea that you as a 
NGO are building up pressure on the American Congress is just ridiculous. You are not 
building up any pressure at all on anyone” (Interview Lidegaard: 116).  
 
From this quote it is evident that the Danish 92 Group used an articulatory practice relating to 
“building up pressure”, which the Prime Minister’s Office found to be too aggressive and even 
“ridiculous”. The articulatory practice of the Danish 92 Group of building up pressure was in line 
with the articulatory practice in the Ministry of Climate and Energy, thus they ended up adopting a 
similar approach (Meilstrup 2010: 88, 134). It was essential for the Ministry of Climate and Energy 
to build up pressure on the other states, as this would make the price of failing to reach an 
agreement too high (Meilstrup 2010: 88, 134). 
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As Lund argues, an international negotiation is dominated by different structural conditions. As the 
Ministry of Climate and Energy and the Prime Minister’s Office applied different articulatory 
practices among their respective ministries, the Danish 92 Group was inclined to side with the 
Ministry of Climate and Energy, as they pursued the same goal of a binding agreement.  
 
From the above, this seems to strengthen hypothesis 2, as it assumes that domestic structures are 
determining the possibility of NGOs to get influence. Following the logic of hypothesis 2, the 
domestic structures comprise normative and organizational arrangements. From the above, it seems 
that the Danish 92 Group did in fact not manage to adjust to these structures when trying to pursue 
influence at the COP15, as they were unable to adjust to the discursive practices and values set forth 
by the Prime Minister’s Office.  
 
The argument is supported by Lidegaard, who “found most of the international NGOs much more 
focused on substance and the Danish groups much more focused on formalities.” Thereby he shows 
that international NGOs, such as the World Resources Institute, in fact managed to use the same 
discursive practices as the Prime Minister’s Office, and thereby create a better space for 
collaboration. Hence, it could be argued that the “soft constructivist” approach of hypothesis 2 
provides explanatory power to this specific empirical evidence of values and normative settings 
having an effect on the negotiation. In contrast, hypothesis 1 does not provide any explanatory 
power as to how articulatory practices, values and norms could potentially influence the strategies 
pursued by the NGOs in order to gain influence.  
 
Sum up 
As shown from the above, values, normative setting and a difference in articulatory practices had an 
effect on the cooperation between the Danish 92 Group and the Danish Presidency. This provides 
hypothesis 2 with a strong explanatory power, as it emphasises these factors in determining NGO 
influence.  
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4.5 Sub conclusion on the analysis 
The analysis investigated to what extent the Danish 92 Group sought to influence the COP15 
through domestic polities of states or by working across boundaries in order to gain direct influence 
on the negotiations. This was done in order to test the explanatory power of our two hypotheses 
based on two “less likely” critical cases. This sub conclusion now seeks to present the main findings 
in relation to, which hypothesis has the most explanatory power in answering our problem 
statement. In the following we intend to draw upon the theoretical assumptions within each of our 
two hypotheses in order to discuss the main findings.  
 
First theoretical assumptions 
We will start by addressing the first assumption from each hypothesis, which are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1, assumption 1: 
Government representatives have a monopoly on external representation of the state. 
 
Hypothesis 2, assumption 1: 
In international negotiations government representatives do not have a monopoly on the external 
representation of the state. 
 
As outlined in the indicator of access the basic structure of the COP gives the first assumption in 
hypothesis 1 more explanatory power compared to hypothesis 2, since NGOs are only given an 
observer role and limited access to the negotiations. The analysis shows that this limits them from 
representing the state externally, as they have no formal access to the negotiations and thus rely on 
others to represent their opinions. This is exemplified by Lidegaard, who states that: 
 
“You have to understand that a negotiation is not a forum in which everyone has an 
equal voice. It is a room where you try to hammer out a hard bargain between countries, 
which have real interests at stake, and they are represented not by NGOs but by their 
governments” (Lidegaard 2015: 120).  
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Thus, in his experience, the COP-negotiations are an intergovernmental arena, where NGOs cannot 
be said to represent the state in any way. Drawing upon the indicator of access, the analysis has 
shown that this statement was supported by the exclusion of the Danish 92 Group from the Danish 
delegation in the lead-up to COP15. This indicates that the Danish government sought to 
monopolise representation of the state, which excluded the possibilities of the Danish 92 Group 
being part of the representation of the state.  
 
It can thereby be concluded that the Danish 92 Group was not a part of the representation of the 
state in any way at the COP15, which indicates that the Danish government holds the monopoly on 
the representation of the state. Thus, hypothesis 1 set forth by Putnam seems to provide explanatory 
power to the empirical findings in relation to the first theoretical assumptions.  
 
Second theoretical assumptions 
Proceeding to the second theoretical assumptions of the two hypotheses, we likewise seek to outline 
their explanatory power. The assumptions are: 
 
Hypothesis 1, assumption 2: 
2. The principal tool for Level II actors to exploit the two-level game is to influence domestic 
political dynamics. 
 
Hypothesis 2, assumption 2: 
2. NGOs can work transnationally in order to gain influence, but they must adjust to the existing 
structures. 
 
Beginning with theoretical assumption 2 in hypothesis 1, our analysis has shown that the Danish 92 
Group sought to exploit the two-level game by influencing the domestic political dynamics in 
regards to the indicator of resources, access and activities. In the indicator of resources the analysis 
found that the Danish 92 Group tried to use coalition building, the pressure from civil society, and 
knowledge sharing in order to influence the negotiations at the COP15. Furthermore, drawing upon 
the indicator of access and activities, the Danish 92 Group sought to get access to the Danish 
government, while also utilising all of their activities in the hopes of influencing the domestic 
political dynamics.  
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As shown in the indicator of access, the Danish 92 Group’s level of access to the Danish 
government was high, as exemplified by their regular meetings. The Danish 92 Group sought to use 
this access to gain influence on the COP-negotiations, as argued by Christensen:  
 
“We were, as we are today, focusing on the Danish government. We were focusing on 
lobbying and advocating our viewpoints towards the government. So we had quite an 
intense dialog with them (...)” (Christensen 2015: 92).  
 
Thus, to a large extent the Danish 92 Group used their access and activities towards the Danish 
government and thereby pursued to gain influence through the domestic level. This empirical 
evidence seems to strengthen hypothesis 1, as the Danish 92 Group utilised most of their resources 
on exploiting the two-level game through the domestic level.  
 
However, the analysis furthermore found that the Danish 92 Group did not exclusively pursue a 
strategy that sought to influence the domestic arena. As outlined in the indicator of access the 
Danish 92 Group sought to build coalitions with international networks such as CAN in order to get 
access to other government representatives. Thus, it seems hypothesis 1 lacks explanatory power to 
explain this empirical evidence, as it could be argued that the Danish 92 Group sought to influence 
the negotiations directly through transnational networks.  
 
In contrast, this seems to strengthen the explanatory power of hypothesis 2 set forth by Risse-
Kappen. As the analysis furthermore found that as strategy related to hypothesis 1 was not 
successful for the Danish 92 Group it indicates that the Danish 92 Group did not manage to adjust 
to the existing structures, which became evident in the indicator of discursive practices.  
 
Thus, the explanatory power of hypothesis 2 seems to be further strengthened by this analytical 
finding. This suggests that even though hypothesis 1 to a large extent holds explanatory power in 
regard to the empirical findings, hypothesis 2 also manages to strengthen its theoretical propositions 
in regards to the transnational coalition building between The Danish 92 Group and CAN.  
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Third theoretical assumptions 
Finally, we seek to investigate the third theoretical assumptions of our hypotheses. The two 
theoretical assumptions are: 
 
Hypothesis 1, assumption 3: 
3. Government representatives are to a large extent responsive to domestic pressure. 
 
Hypothesis 2, assumption 3: 
3. Epistemic communities are an important tool for NGOs to have an impact on international 
negotiations. 
 
The analysis has shown that the Danish 92 Group to a large extent targeted the Danish government 
when building coalitions and using their activities as a tool in order to influence the domestic 
political dynamics. In regard to the third theoretical assumption of hypothesis 1, it could be argued 
that the Danish 92 Group was pursuing this strategy as they expected government representatives to 
be responsive to domestic pressure. As shown in the indicator of access and in the indicator of 
activities, the Danish 92 Group had both access to and a close dialog with the Danish government. 
Furthermore, Christensen claims that by drawing upon outside lobbying strategies such as 
interaction with the press, the Danish 92 Group tried to put pressure on the government: 
 
“(…) Of course our main focus was with the government in general, and then, in 
relation to that, the dialog with the press and the public, in the sense that they can to a 
certain extent influence the government or put pressure on them”  
(Christensen 2015: 100).  
 
Thus, the empirical evidence indicates that the Danish 92 Group did pursue a strategy where they 
expected the government representatives to be responsive to domestic pressure. The actual degree 
of governmental responsiveness is beyond this report, but the strategies pursued by the Danish 92 
Group do seem to strengthen hypothesis 1 relating to this third assumption. However, our empirical 
evidence indicates that the Danish 92 Group did not succeed in pressuring the Prime Ministry’s 
Office, as they were not able to speak the same “language”.  
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Drawing upon our indicator of discursive practices our empirical data suggests that a fundamental 
difference in values, norms and articulatory practices between the Danish 92 Group and the Prime 
Ministry’s Office led to a break down in the coalition between them, and thereby in the ability of 
the Danish 92 Group to gain influence in this ministry. The fact, that our empirical evidence seems 
to suggest that discursive practices had an effect on the negotiations does not find explanatory 
power in hypotheses 1. Adversely, hypothesis 2 does provide explanatory power to this analytical 
finding, as the theoretical assumptions take normative settings and values into account.  
 
Turning to the theoretical assumption 3 from hypothesis 2, it is expected that epistemic 
communities are an important tool in influencing international negotiations. In the indicator of 
resources the analysis found that international NGOs managed to build epistemic communities in 
order to influence the COP15 directly. According to Lidegaard, international NGOs like Project 
Catalyst managed to use their technical knowledge by acting as an epistemic community in order to 
gain influence on states. This seems to strengthen hypothesis 2 with regards to assumption 3, as 
Project Catalyst used their epistemic knowledge as an important tool to influence the COP15 
negotiations. This is further clarified by Lidegaard, as “it is obvious that if you make yourself 
relevant, you are closer to the process” (Lidegaard 2015: 124). 
 
Sum up 
Overall, the analysis found that based on the empirical data, hypothesis 1 does have more 
explanatory power in the “less likely” critical case of the Danish 92 Group in relation to the “less 
likely” critical case of COP15. In delineating the first theoretical assumptions set forth in both 
hypotheses, it became quite evident that the Danish government had a monopoly on the external 
representation of the state.  
 
In regards to the second theoretical assumptions, the analysis found that the Danish 92 Group 
mostly pursued a strategy, where they sought to exploit the two-level game by seeking to influence 
domestic political dynamics. This is seen in the indicators of resources, access and activities. 
However, the Danish 92 Group furthermore tried to build coalitions with transnational networks 
such as CAN, in order to join forces to influence the Danish government. Hypothesis 1 does lack 
some explanatory power in relation to this empirical evidence, as this hypothesis would expect the 
Danish 92 Group to seek influence domestically and not work across borders.  
 	 66	
Thus, the second theoretical assumption of hypothesis 2 manages to strengthen its explanatory 
power, as this hypothesis would assume the Danish 92 Group worked transnationally in order to 
gain influence.  
 
Finally, the analysis found that the Danish 92 Group pursued a strategy, where they tried to exploit 
the two-level game, as they expected the Danish government to respond to domestic pressure. 
However, the empirical evidence seemed to indicate that this strategy did not succeed, as different 
values, norms and articulatory practices dominated the relationship between the Danish 92 Group 
and the Prime Ministry’s Office. This empirical data is beyond the explanatory power of hypothesis 
1, wherefore hypothesis 2 is strengthened in regard to this specific data. The explanatory power of 
hypothesis 2 was strengthened even further, as the international NGOs managed to build epistemic 
communities and succeeded in influencing the negotiation directly. However, in the case of the 
Danish 92 Group hypothesis 1 does seem to provide the most explanatory power as to which 
strategy they pursued, when trying to influence the negotiation. There are however areas within the 
negotiation, in relation to transnational networks, epistemic communities and discursive practices, 
which hypothesis 1 cannot fully encapsulate. On those notes, hypothesis 2 instead seems to provide 
explanatory power and strengthen its theoretical assumptions.   
4.6 Analytical discussion 
In this chapter we seek to discuss the outcome of our analysis in order to fully answer our problem 
statement: 
 
To what extent did NGOs seek to influence the COP15 through domestic polities of states or by 
working across boundaries in order to gain direct influence on the negotiations? 
 
Our analytical findings have shown that the hypothesis 1 set forth by Putnam seem to provide the 
most explanatory power to our empirical findings. From this it seems the Danish 92 Group sought 
to influence COP15 through domestic polities of states. However, our analysis has shown 
furthermore, that hypothesis 2 set forth by Risse-Kappen, likewise is able to provide explanatory 
power in some areas of our analysis. In the following, we thus wish to critically reflect upon and 
discuss our analytical findings in relations to the methodological case design, the scope of the term 
non-state actors and the theoretical interplay between the two hypotheses.  
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4.7 Methodological case design 
Our analysis has shown that in the case of the Danish 92 Group, they did seek to influence the 
COP15 through domestic polities of states, which gives explanatory power to hypothesis 1. This is 
especially evident, as government representatives did have a monopoly on the external 
representation of the state. The Danish 92 Group further sought to utilize its resources, ability to get 
access and activities in order to exploit the two-level game by trying to influence domestic political 
dynamics. However, hypothesis 1 appears to be lacking explanatory power in some areas within our 
analysis with a special regard to transnational networks, epistemic communities and discursive 
practices. That NGOs work across boundaries in order to gain influence on the negotiations did not 
seem to reflect the main strategy pursued by the Danish 92 Group, but this hypothesis did however 
seem to be strengthened when taking international NGOs such as Project Catalyst into account.  
 
This leads us to critically reflect upon our chosen case and methodological design. As scholars 
based in the critical rationalist tradition, we sought to critically test the assumptions set forth in the 
two hypotheses based on two “less likely” critical case studies. As hypothesis 1 seems to provide 
explanatory power to our case, despite the use of a “less-likely” critical case, it significantly 
strengthens the theoretical assumptions within it. However, it could be argued that since hypothesis 
2 seems to be strengthened in some areas within the analysis, where hypothesis 1 lacks the 
explanatory power, it indicates that our case design has been too “critical”.  This leaves us to 
consider, whether hypothesis 2 would have been able to provide more explanatory power on a 
different case, let alone on a transnational NGO. By choosing the Danish 92 Group, it could be 
argued that this case favours the explanatory power of hypothesis 1, thus having an overly critical 
case design in regards to hypothesis 2.  
 
In further delineating this point, our interviewee Eva Jensen quite distinctly alternated between 
green NGOs and knowledge-NGOs, when referring to NGOs. Hence, she argued that the Danish 92 
Group was a green NGO, while some of the bigger international NGOs could be characterised as 
knowledge-NGOs (Interview Jensen). From this distinction, it could be argued that had we chosen 
an NGO more closely relating to that of an epistemic community, the empirical findings would 
seem to have found a higher degree of explanatory power in hypothesis 2. However, as critical 
rationalists the intention with this research was to put our theoretical framework through the 
strictest test possible, wherefore our case design is what strengthens the analytical findings.  
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Thus, the conclusion of hypothesis 1 having a higher degree of explanatory power than hypothesis 2 
in the case of the Danish 92 Group seems to reflect a higher validity.  
 
4.8 The scope of non-state actors 
In following this line of reasoning, we would like to address the scope of the term non-state actors, 
as our empirical findings seem to suggest this could have constituted an omitted variable in relation 
to our final conclusions.  
 
The report has worked with the term non-state actors only in regards to our definition of NGOs. 
However, non-state actors include a wide range of actors such as Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs). Our empirical framework does not cover the fact that MNCs are now seen as an essential 
part of dealing with climate changes (Averchenkova et al. 2015: 2-3). This perception, among other 
things, is due to the huge amount of CO2 emitted by the MNCs. Thus, often MNCs play an 
important part in climate policy development. According to a study by Dauvergne & Lister (2011) 
this is evident as MNCs, along with governments and NGOs, increasingly find creative ways to 
leverage the speed, scale, and innovation of big brand governance to augment international laws, 
state regulations and civil society in the effort to manage global environmental change (Dauvergne 
& Lister 2011: 36). As many MNCs such as Coca Cola, Walmart, McDonalds and HP are pursuing 
big brand sustainability, NGOs are, to a larger extent, cooperating with them in order to make an 
impact on climate policies (Dauvergne & Lister 2011: 36-38).  
 
Furthermore, Betsill (2014) finds that MNCs can cooperate with NGOs in transnational networks in 
order to influence states. In addition to this, Lund (2013) argues that MNC also possess technical 
knowledge, which can be used to create epistemic communities. Conversely, Lund (2013) and 
Newell (2000) also argues that MNCs often possess “tacit power”, that leads states to be more 
inclined to meet MNCs interests than regular NGOs, as “... states are structurally dependent on 
private sector profitability” (Lund 2013: 742).  
 
Based on the aforementioned points, it can be argued that MNCs play an important role in climate 
policies. Thus, if we had expanded our focus to other non-state actors it could be argued that we 
would have been able to capture our field of study more fully.  
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Furthermore, from the above it can be indicated that by including MNCs, we might have found 
evidence that would strengthen hypothesis 2. It could furthermore have increased the 
generalizability of our analytical conclusions, which is highlighted (2014) by both Downie and 
Lund (2013).  
 
By delineating which strategies non-state actors pursue, when trying to gain influence on 
international negotiations, the conclusions therefore must be seen in the light of our chosen case 
design and choice of non-state actors. Had we chosen to focus on CAN, The Project Catalyst or 
MNCs, the explanatory power of Risse-Kappen might have been strengthened.  
 
4.9 Theoretical interplay 
Finally, this leads us to consider the theoretical interplay between our two hypotheses. Our analysis 
has shown that in some areas, where one hypothesis falls short on explanatory power, the other was 
able to bridge the gap in providing an explanation. This follows the argument presented by Checkel 
(2001), that it can be a great advantage to study the empirical reality from both a rationalist and 
constructivist perspective, cf. critical assessment (page 22).  
 
Within the field of IR, rationalists and constructivist hypotheses are often said to overlap, but 
according to Checkel these overlaps make it possible to capture the reality more fully. As the study 
design of this report includes a hypothesis from each of these traditions we argue, that we have been 
able to get a more comprehensive understanding of our case. This can be seen in regards to the 
indicator of discursive practices. As hypothesis 1 is based in the rationalist tradition, it showed a 
lack of explanatory power in relation to this part of our empirical data, which emphasised the 
importance of the articulatory practices applied by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Danish 92 
Group. In contrast to this, hypothesis 2, which was derived from Risse-Kappen´s soft constructivist 
understanding, was able to address the articulatory practices, values and normative settings, that 
proved to have an impact on the strategy the Danish 92 Group chose to pursue. From the above 
discussion it can be acknowledged that our analytical conclusions must be seen in the light of our 
chosen case design, which has been highly influenced by our choice of two “less likely” critical 
cases.  
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However, as scholars based in the critical rationalist tradition, the aim has been, throughout this 
report, to critically test the two hypotheses in the best possible way. One again, as critical rationalist, 
the intention with this research was to put our theoretical framework through the strictest test 
possible. Therefore, our case design is what strengthens the analytical findings of each hypothesis. 
We furthermore argue, that the choice of applying two hypotheses, which are based in two different 
traditions within philosophy of science, has contributed to a greater understanding of the field, in 
which we have researched.  
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5.0 Conclusion 
In this section, we would like to outline our final conclusions and findings in this report. While 
doing so, we have sought to answer our problem statement: 
 
To what extent did NGOs seek to influence the COP15 through domestic polities of states or by 
working across boundaries in order to gain direct influence on the negotiations? 
 
In order to answer our problem statement we tried to test the robustness of two hypotheses set forth 
by Robert Putnam (1988) and Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) on two “less likely” critical cases. 
Thus, we have sought to critically test, which of the two hypothesis holds the best explanatory 
power in investigating which strategies the Danish 92 Group pursued in the hopes of influencing 
policy making at the COP15. In order to arrive at a suitable conclusion to our findings, this report 
has outlined four analytical indicators in determining the strategies pursued by the Danish 92 
Group. These were resources, access, activities and discursive practices. By operationalizing these 
indicators in accordance with the theoretical assumptions from the two hypotheses, this study 
arrived at several interesting findings. 
 
From the analysis, we concluded that the Danish 92 Group tried to exploit the two-level game in 
order to influence domestic political dynamics. They did so by utilising their resources, ability to 
access the negotiations and their activities. The analysis further found that the government 
representatives had a monopoly on the external representation of the state, and that the Danish 92 
Group expected the government representatives to be responsive to domestic pressure. Thus, the 
empirical evidence seems to strengthen hypothesis 1 significantly. 
 
As a continuation of this point, the analysis showed some areas where hypotheses 1 lacked 
explanatory power. In delineating the fact that normative settings, values and ideas had an impact 
on the negotiations, hypothesis 1 was unable to explain this empirical evidence. Hence, hypothesis 
2 had more explanatory power, as the “soft constructivist” approach set forth by Risse-Kappen does 
enhance the importance of these themes. Furthermore, the analysis showed that the strong coalition 
between the Danish 92 Group and CAN could be argued to be a strategy in working across 
boundaries.  
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As hypothesis 1 does not take transnational activities into account it is difficult to conclude whether 
or not transnational activities were an influence on the negotiations directly, or simply an example 
of transnational actors exploiting the two-level game. In conclusion, both hypotheses hold some 
degree of explanatory power in this specific case. The analysis also highlighted the existence of 
international NGOs managed to create coalitions with the Prime Ministry’s Office, as they utilised 
their knowledge as an important resource to influence the negotiations through epistemic 
communities.  
 
However, as the focus of this study was to critically test the explanatory power of the two 
hypotheses on the case of the Danish 92 Group, the analytical findings do strengthen hypothesis 1. 
Nonetheless, the contradictions and overlaps between the two hypotheses led us to critically reflect 
upon our chosen case design and methodological considerations.  
 
In acknowledging that this report has worked with a narrow terminology of non-state actors and a 
strict case design, the final conclusions must be seen in the light of these considerations. As 
scholars based in the tradition of critical rationalism, this report holds that this strict case design 
provides the final conclusions with some degree of validity. Furthermore, we find that, as the two 
hypotheses are based respectively in a rationalist and constructivist approach, they in some regards 
complement each other. This has provided the analysis with the possibility of capturing the field of 
study more extensively.  
 
In total consideration of our findings, we ultimately conclude that hypothesis 1, which holds that 
NGOs seek to influence international negotiations through domestic polities of states, has the most 
explanatory power in the case of the 92 Group at the COP15. 
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7.0 Appendix 
7.1 Interview guide Troels Dam Christensen 
Briefing:  
Explain the overall reason for this interview 
Ask if it is okay to record the interview 
Any questions before we start? 
Starting questions 
What is your name and profession?  
What exact role do you fulfil in the 92-group 
What is the overall aim of the 92-group? 
Research question:  
In what way did the 92-group influence the 
COP15? (Both before and during).  
Interview questions:  
What was the most important issue that the 92-
group tried to address before COP15 – did that 
change during the negotiations?  
What did the 92-group do to shape the agenda 
accordingly with these issues?  
Do you feel successful in doing so?  
What did the 92-group do to shape the position 
of key actors during the negotiations?  
Which actors did you specifically target? 
What is your opinion on the final agreement at 
COP15? 
How did you monitor your own influence 
before or during the negotiations?  
Do you feel that the 92-group had the most 
influence before or during the negotiations?  
Do feel you had any influence at all both on the 
outcome but also on the process?  
 
Research question:  
Did the 92-group mainly pursue a strategy 
related to Putnams two-level games or Risse-
Kappens transnational perspective at the 
COP15? 
Interview questions:  
Can you mention the specific strategies the 92-
group used in order to influence the COP15?  
Which strategy proved the most successful? 
Did you have contact with any chiefs of 
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government during the COP15? If so, in what 
way?  
(Do you believe that the 92-group influenced 
the Danish chiefs of government in any way?) 
Some environmental groups partner up with 
MNCs that pursue big brand environmentalism 
in order to scale up their advocacy. To what 
extent did you cooperate with other non-state 
actors in the same way?  
In what way did you make use of transnational 
networks when trying to influence the 
negotiations?  
How much did the 92-group cooperate with the 
Climate Action Network (CAN)?  
Looking back would or should the 92-group 
have pursued different strategies in order to gain 
a greater influence?  
Follow up questions:  
Elaboration   
Interview questions:  
Is there anything you would like to elaborate on 
or ask us? 
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7.2 Interview guide Bo Lidegaard 
 
Briefing: 
Explain the overall reason for this 
interview 
Ask if it is okay to record the interview 
Any questions before we start? 
Starting questions 
What is your name and profession? 
What exact role did you fulfill in the COP15-
negotiations? 
How would you describe the overall aim of the Danish 
Presidency/government in the negotiations? 
Research question: 
In what way did the NGOs such as the 
92-group influence the COP15? (Both 
before and during). 
 
Interview questions: 
How would you describe the cooperation between the 
Danish government and Danish NGOs?  
How much were you in contact with Danish NGOs? 
Which ones? 
Do you have any informal rules of which NGOs you 
include in the process?  
How did you seek to include them in the process?  
Why did you do this? To get knowledge? To get their 
opinion? To get legitimacy? 
If the Danish NGO´s can be such an asset to the 
negotiations, then why did you decide to exclude them 
from the presidential delegation?  
Research question: 
Did the 92-group mainly pursue a 
strategy related to Putnams two-level 
games or Risse-Kappens transnational 
perspective at the COP15? 
Interview questions: 
Based on your impression, how were the Danish NGOs 
trying to affect you and the government?  
Which issues did you feel the Danish NGOs were trying 
to promote in the COP?  
How were they able to set the agenda on some of these 
issues before and during the COP?  
Which strategies did they use? Advocacy work? Media 
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attention? Demonstrations? 
To what extent did you take into account the NGOs 
relationship with the press?  
To what extent did the Danish NGOs pursue to pressure 
the government by using the press?  
Which strategies did you feel were most effective in 
influencing the Danish government? 
How much of your negotiation strategy is dependent on 
the NGO participation?  
How much did you cooperate and potentially got 
influenced by international NGOs such as the  CAN-
network? 
Which NGOs did you pay most attention to? Danish or 
international? 
Are there other non-state actors such as MNCs or 
business groups that sought to influence you? Which 
strategies did they use and did you find them more 
convincing than the NGOs’?  
Which issues did you feel the Danish NGOs were trying 
to promote in the COP?  
At what stage did you pay the most attention to NGO 
positions and did it change during the process? 
Follow up questions: 
Elaboration  
Interview questions: 
Is there anything you would like to elaborate on or ask 
us? 
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7.3 Interview guide for Eva Jensen 
Briefing: 
Explain the overall reason for this 
interview 
Ask if it is okay to record the 
interview 
Any questions before we start? 
Starting questions 
What is your name and profession? 
What exact role did you fulfil at the COP15? 
How would you describe the overall aim of the Danish 
Presidency/government in the negotiations? 
What was the initial role of the Ministry of Climate and 
Energy at the COP15, and which role did it end up playing?  
What was the difference between the overall aim of the 
climate- and energy ministry and the Prime Minister's 
office?  
Research question: 
In what way did the NGOs such as 
the 92-group influence the COP15? 
(Both before and during). 
 
Interview questions: 
How would you describe the cooperation between the 
Ministry of Climate and Energy and Danish NGOs? And 
which ones in particular?  
How did you seek to include them in the process?  
Why did you do this? To get knowledge? Which kind? To get 
their opinion, legitimacy? 
How much of your negotiation strategy is dependent on the 
NGO participation?  
Research question: 
Did the 92-group mainly pursue a 
strategy related to Putnams two-
level games or Risse-Kappen’s 
transnational perspective at the 
COP15? 
Interview questions: 
Do you feel that the Danish NGOs were more aligned with 
the position of the Ministry of Climate and Energy than that 
of the Prime Minister's office? If so, Why? Did that benefit 
you in any way? Media relations, credibility? 
Based on your impression, how did the Danish NGOs affect 
the position of the Ministry of Climate and Energy?  
How much did you cooperate and potentially got influenced 
by international NGOs such as the CAN-network? 
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Which NGOs did you pay most attention to? Danish or 
international? Did you experience a difference in how they 
approached you? 
How were they able to set the agenda on some of these issues 
before and during the COP? 
At what stage did you pay the most attention to NGO 
positions and did it change during the process? 
Has there been a more inclusion of NGO in the subsequent 
COPs?  
We heard from Troels that there was a dispute between the 
Ministry of Climate and Energy and the Prime Ministry over 
the strategy of the Presidency. Would you agree to this?  
How did this affect the cooperation between the ministries 
during the COP15?  
Follow up questions: 
Elaboration  
Interview questions: 
Is there anything you would like to elaborate on or ask us? 
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7.4 Transcription of the interview with Troels Dam Christensen 
Interview with Troels Dam Christensen 
November 17 2015 
T: Troels Dam Christensen 
M: Mia Bahl Jensen 
D: Daniel Ginge Andersen  
  
M: Okay. So just for starters, we thought you could state your name and profession just for the 
purpose of the interview.  
  
T: Okay. My name is Troels Dam Christensen and I am coordinator for the Danish 92 Group, which 
is a network of Danish NGOs working on sustainable development. So it is 23 different 
organizations, mainly development and environmental NGO’s. At the moment we have three kinds 
of main subjects that we are follow. One of them is the climate. Both the international negotiations, 
but also the domestic and the EU, and then we have a lot of work on the post-2015 goal. The new 
development goals for sustainable development and then CSR or Corporate Responsibility. Then 
we have a lot of other smaller subjects. We are mainly coordinating the Danish NGOs, the members 
work on policy especially targeting international processes. 
  
M: So what is your overall aim of joining the 92-groups or what is the overall aim for the members?  
  
T: Coordination I would say. Policy development, joint policy development and coordination. So 
the whole idea with us is that we are coordinating the joint position making of the NGOs on these 
subjects.  
  
M: That is in order to gain more influence?  
  
T: Yes, hopefully. It is a mix of course. It’s both to be coordinated and thereby gaining bigger 
influence but of course also, kind of capacity wise to know what is going on. So there is a lot of 
capacity building in the work. Also in the sense that when you go to meetings, of course you learn 
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what others are doing and so on. So for some of the members, the capacity building part is 
important also, but in general the purpose is to coordinate the Danish NGOs on different processes. 
 
M: What happens if they have diverging interests?  
  
T: Then we work on it, actually the interesting part is, a lot of time people ask me: “isn’t it difficult 
to coordinate a diverse group of organizations going from Greenpeace, WWF, KR, Danchurch Aid, 
Action Aid, Danmarks Naturfredningsforening, the Ecological Counsel, UN Association, IWGIA 
working with indigenous people”, and actually it is not. The fact is that, probably partly because we 
were working together before 1992, we have a long history of aligning positions towards each other 
and actually knowing why the other organizations have the view point they have and, why it makes 
sense actually and therefore also aligning the positions.  
So actually, often I see the organizations as quite close to each other when it comes to positions. 
Often what happens is that they have specific angles where they focus most, or where they focus 
their attention. But if you for example look at their climate work, there is a quite strong, also 
international, organization between development and environmental NGOs on climate negotiations.  
 
Climate Actions Network is a big network, so in that sense it is not that difficult, but also if you 
look at other issues, it has actually ... I mean often to do with the fact that partly when you see 
differences between organizations it is often in their public appearances. The kind of branding 
situation, what kind of brand do a specific organization have. If you, for example look at 
organizations like Greenpeace and WWF, which people might say are quite different - and they are 
if you look at the work mode or the constituency and so on. But actually if you look at the targets 
they are working for, they are often quite similar and aligned. They have a strong cooperation 
internationally. I would say partly why this is possible, is because we have had this long 
collaboration in Denmark. So we know each other, we know what their positions are, we know why 
the organizations have their positions. So that is partly a result of the 92 Group’s work also.    
The Danish NGO community is quite collaborative if you compare it to other countries. I would 
imagine that if you go to other countries, they have a more competitive situation. At least in some 
countries.  
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M: Turning to the COP15, we have read your position paper, what would say was the most 
important issues for you to promote or to address?  
 
T: I think that at that stage, we had also from CAN - the Climate Action Network – a kind of 
agreement, the agreement that we were going for. This consisted of the requirements needed to 
reach and to have a good agreement. So in that sense we had a kind of success criteria. Of course 
there were some division on how much emphasis you put on one thing or the other but in general 
we had that relatively strongly defined targets and again, there was a very long preparation process. 
If you look at international processes, this was a long, long process and CAN is actually one of the 
best coordinated international groups on international processes. So for that reason there was quite a 
strong success criteria, and of course we were leaning towards that in Denmark. So we were kind of 
looking at CAN and saying: what are the main success criteria.  
  
M: Looking at CAN? 
  
T: Yes. So it was actually a mix of that. But I think that we were going for kind of a fair agreement 
that was also relatively binding. 
  
M: Was that before the COP15? 
 
T: This was before, yes. I think the expectations, if you compare with today and COP21, you would 
say that the expectations back then were much higher. There was really a feeling that you could 
actually reach an agreement that would be a major breakthrough and would lead to solving the 
problems in the sense. It was the feeling that you could actually have this really big agreement. This 
was the success criteria, and this was also the success criteria from the Danish government. 
Afterwards a lot of people said that: “Well, the ambition level was much too high and it was 
unrealistic” and all that stuff coming out but actually, I think that is a mistake. I do not think you 
can blame the Danish government or the UN for having a very high ambition level in the process up 
to the COP15. Because that was the expectation. At that stage you were coming out of the Rio 
Conventions in 92 and actually the COP15 situation was kind of the end point of the belief that you 
could actually make the kind of agreement, which would actually solve a big problem like that 
(snaps). 
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M:  When did you change this issue? During the negotiations?  
  
T:  I think it is still fair to say that up until when the COP15 was still running there, I think there 
was still a hope from the NGOs that it would be possible to have a really strong and big agreement. 
Of course the result was really devastating. It was also much worse than anticipated in any scenario 
nearly. A large part of what we did under COP15 was actually briefing the press that they should 
expect a green-wash, because our feeling was that there were loopholes. For example when you 
talked about reduction goals and you could see that they would try to cover it up. For example land 
use, and talking about land use in the calculations, when you enter into negotiations there is a strong 
risk that you will not be able to actually monitor the emissions and for that reason it becomes a 
loophole. Countries coming in and saying: “We want to have this sector included” and it is really 
difficult to see. So there was a lot of trying to explain to the press that they should focus on this and 
they should look for the green-washing part. Actually, when the COP ended, there was no need for 
that because everybody realized it had been a failure. It was only the Danish Prime Minister and the 
US President that said it had been a success in the start, but even they gave up on that. So you asked 
what our main focus was, right?   
 
M: Yes. The main issues?  
 
T: It is the same issues as you see today, more or less. It is still the level of reductions, the amount 
of reductions in an agreement. It is still climate finance and the security of that. Adaptation might 
not have been that big an issue. I mean, it was an issue, but it was not like we were setting a goal for 
it but. It is still a really important issue.  Quantifiable damage did not exist at that time. The legal 
status of the agreement was a much bigger issue than it is today. At that stage we were still going 
for a legally binding agreement. Something like the Kyoto Protocol. And that has kind of been 
given up on today, more or less. I mean, we are not talking about it anymore, and everybody 
realises that the US was not participating in that case and there is still some discussions, but the 
whole issue of what ‘legally binding’ actually means is something the NGO community is talking 
much less about today.  
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M: What did you do as the 92 Group in order to shape the agenda accordingly to these issues that 
you are mentioning? 
  
T: We were, as we are today, focusing on the Danish government. We were focusing on lobbying 
and advocating our view points towards the government. So we had quite an intense dialog with 
them and we were following all the negotiation meetings up till … When I started   as coordinator 
in 2007 and before that, we followed all the UN negotiation meetings up to COP15, like we do 
today but more intensively. It was like in 2015 (2009 ed.) preparatory negotiation meetings before 
the COP. There was one in Bangkok, one in Barcelona in October, November and so on. We were 
following all of that and in that process trying to influence all the delegations. Today we also have 
more regular meetings with the UNFCCC. We have meetings with them every day more or less, 
and we discuss the positions and so on. We were trying to influence the Danish government’s 
position, and as the Danish government had the Presidency of the COP that was really important. 
The fact that they had the Presidency also meant that of course the international NGO community 
was very interested in influencing them and in the sense that we were important middle men in that 
situation.  CAN for example would work with us to influence the Danish government. We also had 
a major conference in Denmark in May 2015 (2009 ed.), where we had a lot of participants from all 
over the globe come here and coordinate positions. And we had these people in Denmark for a 
week or something like that. So it was quite big. 
  
M: So you cooperated with a lot of foreign NGOs as well?  
  
T: Yes. Of course, we had a host function also. We were kind of the ones coordinating as the hosts, 
but also for policy reasons, so we were actually coordinating the NGOs and helping CAN to do that 
in the process.  
 
M: Trying to influence...?   
  
T: Trying to influence the general NGO positions because of course CAN was shaping the NGO 
position internationally as a network. CAN today have, I do not know, 700 member organizations 
or something like that. So it is quite big. And then of course we were trying to educate the press 
about it, as we also do now. We have briefings with journalists and so on.   
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M: Which actors did you address the most, when you say the Danish delegation?  
 
T: Mainly the Danish delegation of the Danish ministries. The Ministry of Climate and Energy at 
that point and the Prime Minister's office, the Foreign Ministry.   
 
M: Were you in any way in direct contact with the chiefs of government?   
 
T: Not the Prime Minister. We had two or three meetings with Bo Lidegaard, who was the head 
negotiator and head person from the Prime Minister's office. We had a lot of meetings with the 
Ministry of Climate and Energy and that often included members from the Prime Minister's office 
and the Foreign Ministry also. 
 
M: And Thomas Becker...?  
 
T: And Thomas Becker also. Becker left of course in October in Bangkok, right?  Before that we of 
course had a lot of meetings with him.   
 
M: What did you talk about during those meetings? 
  
T: The meetings were on all kinds of all the different issues. You know, what kind of form will the 
agreement take, what will be the expectation on the ambition level for the reductions, how is 
climate finance affected, and so on. So similar issues as we have today. If you look at the 
negotiations they have six issues really. They have reduction, adaptation, finance, technology 
transfer, capacity building and of course the legal form. It is actually fixed in the Convention. So it 
is kind of similar issues.   
 
D: How does your corporation work with the government? Is it knowledge sharing?  
 
T: Yes, it is a mix. I would say we have quite a developed dialogue with the government on the 
climate negotiations of course the reasons for that is, for one thing that we simply have a tradition in 
Denmark for having that kind of dialogue between the ministries and the NGO community. When 
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we go to the post-2015 negotiations now in New York, we have a similar exchange with them. 
There is a tradition of listening to the NGOs and exchanging viewpoints but also to learn from each 
other. That is a part of it. They learn what is going on in the NGO camp and we can learn what is 
going on in the EU for example. There will be this kind of exchange. There is quite a strong 
tradition of doing that, so we would have, especially up to COP15 ... Also because the Danish 
government was very interested in knowing what was going on in the different stakeholder camps: 
What is going on in the NGO camp? Do we need to know that? So they would be interested in 
hearing our information on that. No it was not just us asking them: what is going on in the 
negotiation? but also a kind of mixed purpose. They were also interested in that and for that reason 
they were also interested in having a more regular dialog. 
 
M: Do you feel they influenced you in order to get access? And in what way?  
  
T: Sure. I mean it is an exchange of viewpoints and of course if we come and say: “We think you 
should change your position on climate finance”. For example, they would answer: “Yeah, but the 
reason we have this position is this, this and this”. You would listen to them and of course there 
would be some kind of influencing going both ways. This is the way of dealing with it ... So yes, of 
course there would be. To the extent that we would say: “We understand what you are saying and 
why you are doing it”, they would influence our position. I would still say they are the ones 
deciding, being a part of the whole steering of the negotiation process, which we are not in a sense.  
 
We are not governments, so in that sense you could say that we influence their position the most. 
They are at the receiving end in that sense. I think in general that such an exchange always means 
that you kind of influence each other and advocacy work ... There is different ways of looking at 
advocacy work, but to me in advocacy work it is really important to have a kind of dialog. If you 
want to influence people, of course you can twist their arm, if you are in a power position. But often 
as NGOs, you are not in that position. I mean of course, if I go to a civil servant and say: “I know 
your minister feels like this”, the civil servants will say: “Oh right, oh right we will have to do it 
like that”. but often you have to convince people, and you have to argue your case. And if you good 
at it, you might be able to influence their position. It is always a kind of an exchange situation and 
you have to understand how they are going to be interested in your view point, right? You cannot 
just come out and say: “I think you should do this” and if they say: “all right, but that is not in my 
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thinking at all”. You need to find a way to convince them that this is important, and then you need 
to understand how they are thinking and what their main goals are, why are they doing this and 
where are they moving. I think in general that in such a dialog you are always influencing each 
other.  
  
M: So what are your most important 'power tool' in doing advocacy work?  
  
T: It depends on different circumstances. You can have a situation where the political level is not 
interested in in you. They might be agreeing with you and in that case you can go to a civil servant - 
if you are in a strong power position towards them of course. They know that you have a superior 
position about this, there is a problem, right? You can also have a situation where the political level 
is definitely not interested in having a press coverage about this issue and often this happens in 
negotiations because countries will often say: “this is our position”. But actually the position is a 
little bit different because they have some self-interest that they are really not interested in revealing. 
For example, Denmark might say, if you ask the Climate Minister: “Yes, we are working to have a 
lot of climate financing coming to the negotiations. But if you are talking to the finance ministry 
guys they will be saying: “no, no that is not what we are doing. We are not going for high targets 
or anything because that is not in our interest. We need to take care of the funding and one year 
and so on”.  
So, for that reason if you can kind of reveal what the country is really working for. Canada is a class 
example. Canada for many years had a situation where their domestic situation was that they would 
like to be seen as progressive in the negotiations, but when they came to the negotiations, they were 
really focused on their own interest and avoided any kind of targets on their domestic side. For that 
reason, the Canadian NGOs have been really important because they have been at the negotiations 
reporting back to the public, what the government is doing here. They are saying that they are doing 
something, but they are actually doing the opposite or they are doing a different thing, so in that 
sense you have a power position if you use the public or the press. This is something that often 
politicians are really worried about. Sometimes you will meet civil servants who say: “Well, I do 
not care if you are going to talk to journalists about that” but if you talk with their minister he will 
be really worried about that. That is of course also a power position, but that is in a situation where 
you have a kind of power relationship. Often you do not have that, and you will have to try to 
convince them. You will have to argue with them. This is like that when you take that discussion in 
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any kind of forum. If they say: “we are trying to do this and this and this”  and you say: “hmmm, 
yeah it might be a good idea but if you for example spoke with this person or this country wouldn't 
that be a possibility?”.  
 
There is also an advising situation and you can even help your network. For example, what often 
happens at the moment is that we suggest to the Danish delegation: “I think you should discuss this 
with more of the developing countries and you should try to seek an alliance with the developing 
countries” as I spoke about at RUC. You can then help them with the contacts on that.  For example, 
if some of our development organisations have a good, strong contact net in Africa or whatever, 
they would be able to say: “I think you should talk to the minister from Gambia and I can facilitate 
that. And did you by the way know that Tanzania is working towards this? You should actually talk 
with them”. So in that sense you are actually just helping each other in a sense, right.  
  
M: Was that a strategy that you pursued during the COP15 as well? 
  
T: Yes. This is a kind of mix that is used in different ways. Up to COP15 of course the stakes were 
much higher for the Danish government, because the world public was looking at what they were 
doing. So of course they would be much more sensitive to bad press coverage. For example you had 
the situation where it was clear that there was a division between the Prime Minister's office and the 
Ministry of Climate and Energy on the positions ... If you read the book by Meilstrup you can see 
that very clearly. Connie Hedegaard in the Ministry of Climate and Energy and Bo Lidegaard in the 
Prime Minister's office and to a certain extent the Prime Minister also, and there was a clear 
difference in the strategy.  The Ministry of Climate and Energy people were the ones with Thomas 
Becker and so on, who had been following the UNFCCC negotiations for years, and they felt that 
that was the track you should follow. You needed to follow that track. You needed to negotiate 
among the diplomats in the normal way and then you would deal with the situation that came out of 
that. So that was kind of the UNFCCC track. Then you had the Prime Minister's office saying: 
“Well, that is not leading to anything and taking too much time. We need to have Prime Ministers 
coming in instead and saying we are going to take some of the compromises”.  
 
That was also one of the reasons why you had all these Heads of State coming to the COP. Also in 
that connection there was a feeling that Denmark should then try to broker a deal between the main 
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actors like China, US and so on. This was one of the reasons why we ended up with a mess at 
COP15. For example, the Prime Minister's office had negotiations with US, China and some of the 
draft documents that came out ... There was this famous incident where there was a leak, which is 
actually something that happens all the time ... of course the Presidency has drafts ready because 
they are supposed to do that. But here there was a leak and there was a lot of press about it. At that 
stage the Danish Presidency did not have the credibility amongst many of the countries, because the 
countries felt that they were trying to go behind their back trying to broker a deal with a few actors, 
instead of having it out in the open where everybody could follow it. 
  
M: Did you feel a part of that process in any way?  
  
T: Yes, because we agreed with strategy of the Climate Minister's office on what was needed.  One 
of the problems with going with the Prime Minister’s office strategy is that you end up with an 
agreement where there is only a few countries deciding. Which means more or less that all small 
developing countries are outside the door. They are not going to influence it, which means that the 
agreement will end up being an agreement between US, EU and China.  
 
All the African countries, all the small developing states, island states and so on, their influence will 
be really, really minimized. It is always a problem at UN negotiations in the sense that from the first 
hand the small states have a disadvantage. If you go to a climate negotiation there will be like 5, 10, 
15 negotiation groups and if you come as a small country with one delegate, how are you going to 
cover that? It is impossible, so just for that reason if you come from the US you have 15 people on 
your delegation. That does mean that there is a disadvantage for smaller countries. They do not 
have the capacity, they cannot get any influence. The good thing about the UN is that it is all the 
countries, who are supposed to be a part of an agreement. So there has to be a consensus, right? 
More or less. That means that even small countries can gain influence. That is the good thing about 
the UN but of course that is also the difficult part of it.  But if you drop that and just say that: “the 
agreement is taking place over here in a small room with five or ten countries”, and that is what 
you also risk at COP21 also, then all the small countries, which are many of the poor countries also, 
will not have any influence. For that reason we agreed with what you could call the Ministry of 
Climate and Energy approach that we should still try to negotiate through the UN process. It is 
difficult and it might be really irritating sometimes, but it is the only way you can do it. Then at a 
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certain stage of course you need as a Presidency to step in and say: “OK. Now we have negotiated 
as far as we could and this is our suggestion of what could be the text”. This is what often happens 
in the last week. It will happen at COP21 also. It happened in Peru last year and so on.  
 
M: But how did you help them...?  
  
T: So we helped them in the sense that we went out helping the NGO community by explaining the 
difference between the strategy of Connie Hedegaard and the Ministry of Climate and Energy and 
the Prime Minister's office. Part of the NGO community criticized Denmark and we went out 
saying: “That is fine, you should criticize the Prime Minister and make sure Connie Hedegaard is 
not hit by the criticism”. And if you think about it today, COP15 was a major catastrophe, right? 
Everybody agrees on that. How come Connie Hedegaard was never marked by that? It is a very 
interesting question.  
  
M: Why do you think that is?    
  
T: Because that strategy succeeded. Showing the world that there is a part of the Danish delegation 
that is trying to do the best part they can do and there is another part, with the Prime Minister's 
office, that is trying to go in a different direction. You need to differentiate when you criticize 
Denmark.   
 
M: So that was acknowledged by the community?   
 
T: This was acknowledged. If you look at what happened in Barcelona in October 2015 (2009 ed.), 
CAN had what they call a Fossils Award. Have you heard about that? It is a bit of a stunt. But 
anyway, you give out a Fossil of the Day, which means the country or the actor has done the worst 
thing that day. It is kind of a press thing. You hand it over to the country representatives and you 
have a story why the country has been doing this and this. This is a way for the NGO community to 
participate in the negotiations to blame a country out in the open. In Barcelona for example, 
everybody agreed that the Danish text was leaking and that was a big problem for Denmark, 
because officially they should not have a text. Of course the NGO community agreed that: “we 
need to criticize Denmark for this”, and we kind of helped saying: “OK. You should do that but you 
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should direct it at the Prime Minister's office and not at the Ministry of Climate and Energy 
because there is a difference in their strategies”. They agreed to this, and that is also why it was not 
reflected on Connie Hedegaard in the same way that it was on the administration.  
  
M: So did you focus much more on the Ministry of Climate and Energy when trying to gain 
influence?   
 
T: It was a battle between the two ministries and you can also read that if you read Meilstrup’s book. 
This is the main thing in the book, that there was a clear power battle between the two ministries 
about who is going to decide in the end of the meeting. And we were trying to support the Ministry 
of Climate and Energy, not just because it was the Ministry of Climate and Energy but because we 
thought their strategy was the most correct one. That we kind of told the NGO community in 
general, who was then directing their criticism the right way.  
  
M: Did you feel you had any influence when trying to lobby the Prime Minister's office or their 
civil servants? 
  
T: It is difficult to know because of course you influence when you bring your argument ... Whether 
we could have changed anything I do not know. I think we had a lot of dialog and also because we 
had different intelligence channels. They were interested in having intelligence from us, and we 
were also in our group recruiting really strong, respected advocates from the science sector and so 
on.  For that reason they were also interested in listening to us. It is not like they are just: “Oh they 
are NGOs, we just disagree with them”.  
I think in that sense you always have an influence, just by meeting with them and arguing why you 
think so and so. But it is always really difficult to measure the exact extent of influence when you 
talk about advocacy work, but I think we had influence. In the sense that we dealt with the Danish 
government, but also in the way that we were dealing with the press. Sometimes if you cannot get 
through with a viewpoint towards the government ... If the press is reporting, you might have a 
bigger chance. So there is also kind of a mixed strategy of working with the public and the press. 
 
M: If we turn away from the lobbying towards the Chiefs of Government - now you mentioned the 
press – what other strategies do you pursue as the 92 Group?  
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T: Of course our main focus is with the governments in general and then in relation to that the 
dialog with the press and the public, in the sense that they can to a certain extent influence the 
government or put pressure on them. I think that is kind of the main two stakeholder groups that we 
work with.  
 
M: But if you do not use the press, do you have other ways of reaching the public? Through social 
media and ...?  
  
T: Yes, but when I say press I just mean the general public awareness work. Of course you can say 
that what we can do from the Secretariat here is one thing, brief journalists and things like that, but 
in general, our members then have social media work, Facebook and so on. They have campaign 
groups. I mean, the secretariat is like 3 people. We are mainly focusing on policy coordination. But 
if you then decide that we need to have coverage on this issue, there might be 1, 2, 3, 5 
organizations that say: “OK. We will talk to our campaign people or our press department about 
bringing this out”. That is kind of the way that we diverge our work.  
  
D: But did you try to frame the issue by somehow engaging the public?  
  
T: Yes we did that. I just cannot give you an example right now. One of the things we did, as I said 
was this green-washing issue. That was of course a big issue. We did a lot of briefings. Because the 
journalists would come to us and ask: “What is going on at the negotiations?”, because you know 
the negotiations are not open to the press. First of all they cannot follow the negotiations as we can, 
although we are not allowed to go into the closed door room either. At least we can go into it further, 
and we have a contact net and in the NGO community there is also countries that have people 
sitting at the government delegations as NGOs. So that is another way to get inside. So often the 
journalists are very dependent on us, and one thing is the access but another thing is just explaining, 
because it is so complicated. It is often that you get a negotiation text coming out and they are 
saying: “OK. I do not understand what is going on. Why does it say it like this” and we have to 
explain why ... The reasons are this, and this, and this. So the press is often quite interested in our 
interpretation of what is going on. In that way you of course … we also have a way of explaining 
and thereby also influencing. The relations with the press are important as it normally is with 
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advocacy work from NGOs in democratic countries. This is often the way that you can influence 
the government.   
 
M: To what extent did you make use of transnational networks in order to influence?   
 
T: We did a lot with CAN. CAN was clearly the important network. We had a really close 
cooperation with them and of course, what happens now is the COP is in Paris, so the French NGOs 
have a kind of coordination function because they are the host. There is a lot of focus on the French 
NGOs at the moment as a contact with the government and so on. We had the same role in COP15.   
 
M: Did you feel you had a lot of influence through a transnational network? That you could apply a 
lot of pressure?   
 
T: Yes I would say so. I mean, they were quite interested in including us within the top coordination 
of the transnational network. So in that sense, yes. 
 
M: So some environmental NGOs partner up with multinational companies that pursue 
environmental strategies. Is that a strategy that you pursue?  
  
T: The Danish 92 Group is not doing it to that extent because normally we are not that interested in 
the international advocacy level in the sense that we are leaving that to CAN and many of our 
members Greenpeace, WWF, Action Aid. They are international networks themselves. When you 
go to a COP meeting like in Paris now, our people from the WWF would coordinate with the WWF 
and then they will coordinate with us as a Danish entity. Same with the others. So we will 
coordinate on the basis of what the international networks are also discussing and agreeing on. They 
will do that often by themselves but also in the context of CAN. So in that sense it's kind of a mix. 
 
M: So made use of the strategy during COP15, in order to cooperate with major multinational 
companies? 
 
T: Not with companies. I think we have an open dialog with for instance the Danish business sector.  
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M: Like the Federation of Danish Industry?  
 
T: And Danish Energy for example. We have a lot of dialog with them. At COP17 in South Africa, 
we did a joint press release with Danish Energy. On the fact that the negotiations were going to 
slow and so on. This was after one week of the COP. You can probably find that web page also. In 
some instances we do joint activities, but as a Danish network we will mainly do it with Danish 
partners. We will leave the international stuff with the international NGOs. 
  
M: And why is that? 
  
T: We are a part of CAN so we should be aligned with CAN's positions. If someone wants to have 
an international collaboration for example, I would not do that as a Danish NGO. Unless I go 
through some of our NGO networks or through CAN. In that sense, we focus mainly on the Danish 
government. If you want to influence the Danish government it is better to just talk to Danish 
stakeholders like Danish Energy or something like that. That is why we do as we do, not as the 
Danish 92 Group. I am not normally in any dialog with any major multinational companies. I might 
be in contact with a lot of Danish NGOs. I mean, for example in relation to the SDG-process we 
had dialog with Danfoss and Vestas. But this is all the good guys, who are following the process 
anyway.   
 
M: But looking at COP15, what strategies did you find were the most successful? You've talked of 
lobbying, press and activism in general?  
  
T: A lot of people says that the COP15 was a catastrophe and in a sense it was of course, but I guess 
it also depends on what could have been the result. At least what we avoided at COP15 was an 
agreement, which was sold to the public as a good agreement and an agreement where at least the 
rich part of the world got off the hook, did not have to do anything. The poorest countries were left 
with the burden of climate change and at the same time the rich countries succeeded in convincing 
the press that this was an OK agreement. That situation we did not end up in. Which was a fair risk 
from the start. What you will see at COP21 is that at the final day, my guess is that the NGOs will 
criticize the agreement, like we always do. But at least you have to read why we do it and a lot of 
governments will come out and say: “Well, it was not the best agreement in the world but it was 
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OK”. There is this need from governments to prove that this is worth doing, especially France for 
example will need to have a success. So there is a strong pressure from all their press people, all 
their communication people to sell to the public that this was a success. If you look at COP15 ... Of 
course we ended up in a situation where it was clear to everybody because it was so chaotic … there 
was a lot of countries protesting and frustrated, so it was clear to the press that this is not a success. 
More so  than if you had just ended up in a slightly more moderate result where you did not have 
that kind of fighting. At least we managed not to end in a situation where there was a deal that was 
sold as a success but actually was much worse.  
 
M: But out of all the strategies that you can pursue as the 92 Group, where did you think you got 
the most influence? Was that through talking to the government or talking to the press? Did you 
ever feel: “Now we have a breakthrough”?   
  
T: That is a good question. I think in some smaller issues you probably had that situation but I 
cannot remember one right now. But I think in the general picture we never had that kind of 
breakthrough. It was kind of a process and it was approaching the situation where you could see 
that the deal would not be sufficient. At the end it was clear that there was a kind of breakdown. We 
did not know that just a few days before or at the end actually. 
  
M: Do you have a way to monitor your own influence? 
  
T: No. It is difficult. When I have to do reporting to the donors, we receive funding from the Danish 
government also, so they ask for a report: “What did you achieve last year?”. My members would 
do the same and of course when you have to report back on what you achieved, it is difficult when 
you do advocacy work because often advocacy work is a part of the sum of influence. If for 
example I talk to the Danish government and they change position afterwards, is that because we 
spoke with them or is it because they were already in that process? It is difficult to say. If you are 
doing project activities in Southern Africa and building school and you are the one doing it, you can 
see that: “We did build a school and that is a success”. If you do lobby work it is often much more 
difficult to measure. Of course, in some situations you can do it but it is more difficult. 
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M: But looking away from the outcome at the COP15, how would you today rate your influence? 
Did you feel you had any influence? 
  
T: Yes. I think we had influence. But when you talk about influence, this is a global process so for 
the Danish 92 Group, measuring our amount of influence I do not know. I would say the way we 
worked with the international NGO community and our own networks, like international networks 
in our member base, I think we had influence, definitely. It has been a part of the total influencing. 
It will be really difficult to assign: “Exactly this part of the agreement was a result because of the 
Danish 92 Group”.  
  
D: Did you see, apart from the outcome, that in some of the discussions that the Danish government 
had or the international NGOs had that some of the issues you framed were actually discussed?  
  
T: Yes I think so. I cannot remember specific examples. But for example, we had a NGO workshop 
in May with these hundreds international NGOs and some of our members were participating, and 
of course they were trying to influence what the Danish NGO positions would be. I am sure that 
instances where they would say: OK, we are going to listen to the representative from Danish NGO 
X, and I think that is a good idea and we should listen to them”. In that sense I am sure that 
happened. But at the moment it is difficult to just point to a certain issue. I think on the overall, 
general level I would say that what we helped achieve was that the poor developing, vulnerable 
countries and the viewpoints of those were difficult to get around and oversee. Normally in such 
negotiations, it has been the rich part of the world dominating. Actually you could say that COP15 
was one of the first examples of a new world order manifesting itself.  
 
If you look at the Rio Conference and the conventions coming out like the biodiversity, climate and 
so on, they were all coming from a situation in 1992. The Cold War had just ended, the Berlin Wall 
was torn down and there was this feeling that you could now actually do something in the world. 
You did not have that kind of Cold War situation and at the same time you had this strict diversion 
of rich countries and poor countries. It was clear at that stage. Either you were one or the other, but 
when you came up to 2009, that situation had changed a lot. China was a much bigger economic 
power and so on. So you could not just expect a decision making process where by the end the rich 
countries were going to come in a say: “look we are going to do like this. That is it.” I think that 
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what happened there was that the developing countries were saying: “No we are not going to accept 
this. This is not good enough”.  
 
The other thing of course what that climate had – at that stage – become an important issue. One of 
the reasons why … for example in the Biodiversity Conventions. In 2010 they had the actual 20 
targets coming out and they were quite progressive. If you read them: “Wow, they got away with 
that”. I mean some of these things are really strong issues. A part of the reason why they do that is 
that they send a lot of technical people down there who are interested in biodiversity and they say 
that: “We need to do this” and they say: “Yes, we agree on that”. Then when they come back the 
finance minister says: “What?”. That did not happen at climate anymore. Climate was not some 
small issue out there, where you can take a decision and it does not really matter. It will not change 
the mainstream anyway. At that stage climate would change the mainstream, because everybody 
realized that our development space is going to be shaped, partly, by how much CO2 we allowed to 
be emitted into the atmosphere. So at that stage climate was an important economic issue, a 
development issue. Before that, environment was something nice to do but not really important. At 
that stage climate was becoming an important issue also for Heads of State.  
  
D: Do you think that is partly down to what you do as NGOs? 
  
T: Yes. It is partly because of that, but also because climate is so important today. Just compare it to 
biodiversity, because biodiversity is ... We would as NGOs claim that this is just as important as 
climate. If you destroy the biodiversity base of our life, I mean you destroy all of the economic 
sectors. You cannot have a culture and so on. In that sense if the species are disappearing, we have 
a problem. But it might be in 200-300 years and it is difficult to measure and so on. Climate is 
clearly easier to measure. You have a climate scientist that clearly says: “This is the budget you 
have, and if you want to … this is it” and at the same time if you are going to take climate seriously, 
you have to stop emitting so much which means you have to stop using coal for example. Which is 
an economic factor. So for many developing countries this is a matter of: “Are we going to be 
industrialized or not?” traditionally thinking. Now of course it is different because you have 
renewable energy and so on. But at that stage that was like: “If we are not allowed to emit that kind 
of CO2, we cannot build the power plants that we expected. That means that we do not have the 
electricity and power. So we cannot get industrialized. It is clear”.  
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Of course, at that stage climate was becoming a mainstream issue and it was important for the 
economic development of the countries. Also the fact that inviting Heads of State to the meeting 
also meant that suddenly it’s on the agenda. Up until COP15, the Heads of State were beginning to 
discuss this. If you remember Anders Fogh for example? When Anders Fogh came into office as 
Danish Prime Minister he did not like climate at all. But after a few years, he found out: “Actually 
when I go to the UN and the EU, they talk about climate. So, the other Heads of States were talking 
about climate. It might be important, I might listen”. By the end when we got the COP15. It became 
an important issue for him too because he could see that there was a lot of interest. So it is a mix of 
factors, but I think it is important to understand that environmental problems now, at least some of 
them are issues that are some important for mainstream economy and mainstream development that 
it’s not just something that you can… If you solve them it has implications. Implications for you 
economic development. That is why it is become such an important battlefield. You are talking 
about development rights.  
 
M: But as you are saying now we have more and more NGOs, we have a huge increase, do you 
think you’re being taken more seriously, for instance at COP15 or any other international 
negotiation, if more NGOs team up?   
 
T: Yes. Clearly.  
 
M: Was that a strategy that you pursued? #00:53:12# 
  
T: I think that happens automatically. It is the same in Denmark. The fact that we are working 
together in the 92 Group of course gives us more power and influence than if we were working 
individually. It is the same internationally. The fact that we actually have a relatively coordinated 
international network means that you have qualified positions, you have qualified work, which 
means you have stronger influence. It is clear if you compared the post-2015 process with the 
climate process, that in the post-2015 process the coordination between the NGOs wasn’t that 
strong. Whereas CAN is probably the best coordinated international organisation at the moment. At 
least among the bigger ones, environmentally. So there is no doubt about the fact that you have a 
relatively well coordinated NGO convergence means a lot. 
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M: At the COP, you were not allowed within the negotiation rooms? 
  
T: Partly. The UN negotiations, with the Rio Conventions, is that you can often get access to at least 
the starting situation. These negotiations can go on in quite open rooms, going into smaller and 
smaller rooms. At a certain point the NGOs are asked to leave the room and then as I said, in some 
of the NGO delegations you actually have people sitting in the government delegations. So for 
example, some of the developing countries do not have technical expertise and they would ask local 
NGOs, who would have to take leverage, to take part as members of the delegations. They are also 
part of CAN. Of course, this is something that sometimes happens officially and sometimes less 
officially because some government do not want to know that this government actually has a NGO 
sitting at the negotiations, so when I talk to that person it might actually come out of the room. 
Actually we were part of the Danish delegation up until 2007. If we go to a meeting in New York 
now in the SDG-process we run around with Danish delegation badges. 
  
M: Why didn’t you at COP15? 
  
T: At COP15 they decided in 2008 that it would not be possible anymore. I think the official reason 
was that it would be difficult for the Danish delegation because it would be such a hugely important 
delegation to have NGOs running around with a badge, because there is a risk that you can misuse it. 
You can say: “I am from the Danish delegation. You can tell me this secret”. This was the official 
reason. I think it was trying to make sure, because the negotiations was sensitive to avoid any kind 
of leaks.  
  
M: Did you maintain that close relationship? 
  
T: What happened then was … we were saying then: “if we cannot have that …” of course we were 
protesting because it is going against the Danish tradition of including NGOs in the delegations. But 
then the compensation was that we had meetings with them every day. We still have that. When we 
go to Paris for example, we will have more or less daily meeting with them. 
  
M: That was with both the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Climate and Energy?  
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T: No. This would be with the civil servants.  
 
M: From both ministries?   
 
T: Yes. Mainly the Ministry of Climate and Energy.   
 
M: Then you were told the process?  
 
T: Yes, these were kind of exchange meetings. We discussed the progress and what is going on. 
You know, who is hearing what and so on. We had that kind of exchange regularly, normally every 
day. Often what happens is that the ministers come in the second week. The climate ministers and 
(mumbling ed.) ministers and often they take over the leadership of the delegations of course. If you 
then have these daily meetings with the delegations – and often there will also be other stakeholders 
coming in: Danish Industry will come in, Landbrug & Fødevarer will come in and they will have a 
representative too pressuring to have some kind of briefing from the Danish minister because they 
want to know what is going on. Therefore, the second week the minister will be there briefing a 
later delegations in a sense, including NGOs and Danish Industry and who is there and their status. 
And if you are lucky you can actually get an exchange of viewpoints there too. For example, Martin 
Lidegaard when he was the minister, they were quite open to that discussion. Whereas, other 
ministers are more careful for different reasons. So it depends a bit on the person.  
 
M: On a final note, did you at COP15 talk to any other Chiefs of Government from any different 
country?   
 
T: I’m not sure any Chiefs of Government… 
  
D: Or just delegates from any other government? 
  
T: Of course yes we did. We spoke with different delegates. 
  
D: Was that mostly from developing countries or?   
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T: If I look in my membership group, Danchurch Aid, Mathias Søderberg, has a strong network of 
southern NGO partners, including southern government partners. He has a very strong network that 
he can use. He will meet with the delegation of Mali or one person from there. Sometimes this is 
just over a cup of coffee and sometimes it is more of a meeting. The other thing is that CAN also 
organize those kinds of meetings. CAN will say: “we will have a meeting with the NGOs and this 
government - US government, Chinese whatever”. They will then put together a delegation to meet 
those delegations. They would then say: “The main subject to discuss with the US delegation is: X, 
Y and Z. Who from our work group are the main persons to include in that situation?” So they have 
a working group on finance and they have a working group on mitigation, adaptation or whatever. 
CAN has like 15 different working groups, 20 maybe on different subjects. They are the one 
developing the positions on these subjects. If you have a meeting with the delegation – and it is an 
international meeting – then you can say the head of that working group needs to be there ... 
Sometimes you are a part of that also. There we would meet ministers and so on. But I do not think 
… I think we met with the Swedish Minister and so on a few times.  
 
M: But were you closer to the process at COP15 then CAN or were they as close and as progressive 
and as influential? 
 
T: We are a part of CAN. In that sense you cannot distinguish there. CAN is an international 
network so of course they are more influential than we are. We are just a part of CAN. We would 
normally be working through CAN. 
 
M: But this was different. This was…?  
  
T: What would happen normally, would be that we would coordinate with CAN that we would 
participate because we were the NGO part of the Danish Presidency. In that sense, we would go to 
more meetings. CAN would ask us more often: “We need someone from the Presidency to come 
here as NGOs”. Like they are doing with the French at the moment. They will ask the French 
NGOs to participate in more. So of course, there was more to do in connection with being the NGO 
host. 
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D: We are just wondering if you looking back at the COP15, if there is anywhere, where you think: 
“We should have pursued a different strategy to get more influence”?  
  
T: It is difficult to say. I think to see how we could have … No I do not think so. I think we did 
what we had to do in the situation. We did a lot of activities. We put a lot of effort into it, just as an 
example, I mentioned this big NGO conference over a week in may. There was a lot of effort from 
different places. So I think it is difficult to say we should have done something different. Probably 
there were but not on the big picture 
  
M: Is there anything you would like to elaborate?  
 
T: No, and I have to run out of the room.   
 
M: Yes of course. Thank you.                                
      
                                            
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 	 111	
7.5. Transcription of the interview with Bo Lidegaard 
Interview with Bo Lidegaard 
November 24 2015 
 
B: Bo Lidegaard 
M: Mia Bahl Jensen 
D: Daniel Ginge Andersen  
 
M: Just for the purpose of the interview, we were hoping you could state your name and profession 
during the COP15. 
 
Bo Lidegaard: I was the chief advisor to the Danish Prime Minister during the COP. So I was in full, 
deputy permanent secretary in the Prime Minister's office. I was at the civil servants level, the main 
advisor responsible for advising the Prime Minister.  
 
M: OK. And how would you describe the overall aim of the Presidency for the COP15 and the 
overall aim for the agreement? 
 
B: The overall goal you mean? 
 
M: Yes. 
 
B: The ambition was very close to what you would also see as the EU basic position and nationally 
within the EU. Denmark was at the ambitious side of where we wanted the EU to be, and the EU 
was at the ambitious side of where we wanted the global outcome to be. Our national position of 
course was to get as far as we possibly could during the negotiations. The difficulty being the 
Presidency is of course the delicate balance between what you want to achieve and what you think 
is possible to achieve, considering the various positions of the Parties to the Convention. So the 
basic role of the Presidency of course is a continuous series of consultations where you figure out 
basically two things, which may seem identical but are not: You try to figure out where the 
fundamental red lines are for the main stakeholders in an agreement, in other words, what will this 
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or that other party never agree to? What can they not agree to? What will they not agree to? What is 
inconceivable for them to agree to? So that is sort of mapping out the various red lines. In the same 
process, what do they want to agree to? What is their ambition, what do they want to get out of it? 
For all Parties, for all some 200 countries, there are these sets of parameters, what they will never 
agree to and what they want to achieve. So the role of the Presidency is not so much what we want, 
which is obviously a strong responsible agreement, but it is to try to see, if there is any way in this 
extremely complex picture of red lines and ambitions. We can map out something some content, 
some formality in an agreement that will eventually command consensus. Our mission was more to 
try and find these common grounds than it was to promote Danish interests. 
 
M: During those negotiations how would you describe your cooperation with NGOs or Danish 
NGOs in particular? 
 
B: We had a close collaboration in the sense that we were briefing them at a regular basis.  
 
M: During the negotiations? 
 
B: During the consultations and the negotiations. A month ahead of the negotiations we were 
meeting with them at a regular basis. So did the Ministry for Climate, me and the Prime Minister's 
office, and at those briefing meetings we of course sounded them out as to their positions, and their 
perceptions of where other Parties to the Convention were. I mean, they have their own sources of 
information and very early on it was clear that, on one particular issue in particular, we had a quite a 
different assessment of the strategy and this is related to what I described as the red line scenario 
and the ambition scenario. This is the question of the formality of an agreement and you will notice 
that also for the Paris Conference this is one of the forms, one of the subjects that is sparking the 
negotiations right now.  
 
The formality of the agreement - of any agreement - is a very tricky issue. The EU and most NGOs, 
- in particular an NGO like the Danish 92 Group they want a strong agreement in the sense of a 
legally binding agreement with provisions for compliance treaty sort of thing. One of the main 
ambitions for NGOs was to get to an agreement of that form and status. For us it was clear very 
early on that such an agreement could not be made. That was a red line for a number of main parties, 
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including the US, China and India. So basically the only major party wanting an agreement of that 
nature was the EU, and the reason for that is very clear. The way the EU itself is constructed and 
the EU has based its own regulation on the Kyoto Protocol, which is a treaty. For us at the 
Presidency it was clear that the US would never agree to an agreement of that nature. They agreed 
to but did not ratify Kyoto. China was very clear that the only reason they were part of Kyoto was it 
does not include any commitments on their part. Nor on any other developing country, so to make 
the formality of a legally binding agreement, the main criteria for success was to be heading 
towards disaster. 
 
M: Ok it was too ambitious? 
 
B: That is a very typical NGO reaction. Too ambitious meaning the way we do in the EU is the 
right way and the ambitious way, and everyone else is wrong. So if you do not agree with us, it is 
because you are not ambitious, but that is not strange that the EU thinks that way, but to us it 
became obvious that if we wanted a strong and ambitious agreement it was probably the worst place 
to start to focus on the legal aspects. If you focused on substance, on reduction of emissions, you 
had much more flexible positions and much fewer red lines. So early on it became a dilemma in the 
Danish Presidency, that where the EU very much saw the legal issue as the core of the negotiations, 
we tended to side with those who saw actual reductions as the main objective. 
 
M: And who was that? The countries?  
 
B: That was basically the big emitters. 
 
M: Ok. 
 
B: Not that they want to go as far in reductions as we would like them to, but there was a very 
important political decision to be made on whether to sort of start something as we did in Kyoto, 
where our assessment was that the likelihood of the American Congress, to ratify anything remotely 
looking like a new UN treaty, is not small, it is nil. 
 
M: But did that disagreement influence your cooperation with the NGOs’ 92 Group?  
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B: Yes it did. 
 
M In what way? 
 
B: It influenced our position, because they were strongly suggesting to us that not pursuing the 
legality as the main priority was not too ambitious. They were also very strongly suggesting that 
that was not consistent with the EU line. Which is true, and that was why the EU was completely 
shut out of the negotiations at the last part. They had basically focused on something that was not 
within the red lines of virtually all other major parties and no one in the EU could get out of that 
box. Partly because the NGOs were so sensitive on that particular goal: this must be the form of an 
agreement, and here it is of ventured interest to note. To me it is a very interesting observation that 
all major entities in the world, especially the three biggest: the EU, the US and China, find it 
extremely hard to conceive of decisions made in any other way than they themselves are 
constructed, if you understand. The EU when we discuss anything with other partners, our point of 
departure is: you must decide things and organise things the way we have in Europe. If you do not 
do that, it is not right. Strangely enough that is not the way the US sees it, nor China.  They see it as 
if you try to understand how we organise here and you try to comply with that, we can maybe find 
an agreement.  
 
M: So do you experience that the very ambitious goals of the NGOS made them less flexible? And 
that meant that they did not have the same sort of influence on your position? 
 
 B: Again I do not accept the premise that it is very ambitious to start of with a legal question. I 
think the NGOs to a large part focused on the wrong goal. The climate is not saved by a legal text 
the climate is about reducing emissions and if you get too obsessed with legality of formality, you 
may actually be less ambitious. I have never accepted this. This is one of my big disputes with the 
NGO groups, that I do not accept the premise that it is a goal in its own right to arrive at a certain 
legality. As far as I am concerned the formality is a subsidiary question. The real issue here is: 
“How can we make this unruly world cooperate towards ever increasing reduction goals?” That is 
the ambitious goal of formalities is a consequence of that, any formality that would serve the 
purpose of reducing emissions will do, to start at the other end is actually to block negotiations. 
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M: Why did you seek to include the NGOs in the first place? What was the overall purpose for the 
government to include them in the process? 
 
B: I think everyone who is generally preoccupied with this issue, realise that governments can do 
this much and agree to do less than that. If you understand the logic. Besides that citizens, civil 
society, enterprises, research, technology so on so forth will provide a lot of the answers. The idea 
… this is about the way we organise our production, our consumption, our transportation, consumer 
culture and a lot of other things. So the idea that we would ever be able to encompass all of that in 
one legal form of agreement is simply outside the scope of what anyone will ever be able to do. The 
climate negotiations really are about creating dynamics and cooperative structures between 
countries and other forces in society towards ever increasing reductions. Therefore including civil 
society in the discussion is one of the preconditions for arriving at an agreement slash 
understanding that will actually provide the reductions that is needed. 
 
M: Do you recall which Danish NGOs you were primarily in contact with? Or cooperated with? 
 
B: WWF and the Danish 92 Group were the two most active, I guess. But we cooperated with a lot 
of international NGOs, Oxfam and World Resources Institute. 
 
M: CAN network maybe? 
 
B: Yes, generally I found most of the international NGOs much more focused on substance and the 
Danish groups much more focused on formalities. I had some pretty tough exchanges with the 
leaders of the NGO groups in Denmark, because I think they completely missing the point. 
 
M: So you had better cooperation with international NGOs? 
 
B: Yes, for example the World Resources Institute provided a lot of very good information and 
analysis focusing much more on substance. Which measures can actually help reducing emissions? 
And much less on how we can force everyone to be like us, and agree to an agreement that is like us, 
and sort of define success as a question of legality. I know the 92 Group will of course say: “Yes of 
course the aim is to get people to reduce”. It is not that I think the legality was the only issue, it is 
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just that the entry point, through which something that was impossible and obviously impossible 
was to materialize. They sort of thought that they could reshape the world in their own image. It is 
very hard to do. 
 
M: Did you have some sort of informal rules for which NGOs you were cooperating with or 
including in the process? 
 
B: No, basically when we invited to briefings, we invited all the major NGOs and all the active 
NGOs. They were deciding themselves to send representatives that would be at meetings with 5 to 
15 different  NGOs. We would cooperate with anyone who had a contribution. 
 
M: Ok. So based on your impression, in general how did the NGOs try to influence you or the 
government towards their position? 
 
B: I think I was not impressed by the way they approached it, because they had this basic approach 
that we need to put pressure on politicians, we need to put pressure and they were constantly putting 
pressure, as they termed it, on us to put pressure on everyone else and the whole ... 
 
M: How did they do that? 
 
B: … idea that Denmark could put pressure on China, the US, is basically ridiculous. We are in no 
position to put pressure on anyone. We have to build up pressure and this notion. One of the 
discussions I often had with them was: “get off my back with this idea of building up pressure, we 
do not build up pressure on Obama. I mean there is no way, and the idea that you as NGOs are 
building up pressure on the American Congress is just ridiculous. You are not building up any 
pressure at all on anyone.” 
 
M: So which strategies did they use to pressure you? 
 
B: By the drumming up of public opinion and constantly asking us to be more ambitious and being 
very good at making people believe that being ambitious meant being like them. I mean both of you 
just used the term being ambitious as the natural synonym of a legal form. A legal treaty does not 
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have any influence on climate change. Emissions have influence on climate change. These 
negotiations are about reducing emissions and in my view those who are really influencing, are 
NGOs who are working with real measures in civil society to reduce emissions. This can be done in 
many ways. Everything from what can we do in our daily lives to reduce emissions, which is one 
thing many of them did …  
 
But let me give you one example of the international NGO community having completely missed 
the point or lost a good opportunity: A lot of companies then and today claim to be green. You can 
buy green cars, you can buy green whatever. What does it actually mean to be green? What is the 
standard with which you measure if this computer is green compared to another computer. That is 
pretty tough. It is hard for you as a consumer to know, both Apple and others are saying “We are 
green”. If I had been 20 years younger and an NGO, I would have said, “Ok, let us try to organise 
through social media a global network of NGOs, an organisation that will set up a standard for 
green products, benchmarking them against each other and we will through social media rank all 
laptop computers according to their being green”. That would have a tremendous impact, for 
anyone producing laptop computers, or cars or cell-phones. For people to do things as consumers 
that they can actually do, will make an impact and in my view still is one of the main ways to make 
an impact. To sit outside a conference room shouting slogans does not change anything that the 
politicians negotiating inside are doing. Some of the democratically elected politicians, they 
respond to their electorates. Others are not democratically elected leaders. Neither of them changes 
even a digit or a comma because 2000 or 10000 or 20000 Danish NGOs are sitting outside shouting. 
 
M: So activism did not help? 
 
B: Not at all. 
 
B: But activism with substance would help, and does help, and actually a lot of NGOs are 
preoccupied with substance, with measures to reduce emissions. 
 
M: But those are the international NGOs you said before? 
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B: Yes. Mostly, but there a lot of Danish NGOs that do too, in regards to adaptation strategies and 
the whole developmental side. Now we are talking about actually influencing on the negotiations. 
And their activism in the streets was completely a waste of time. 
 
M: So the international NGOs succeeded more in cooperating with you because of their higher level 
of knowledge sharing in general? 
 
B: Yes, and because they tried to figure out ways of addressing the issue, rather than mobilizing 
political will. Politicians respond to their constituencies whether they are democratically elected or 
not, they do not respond to NGOs from a different country who have an opinion very, very far from 
their political reality. 
 
M: Was it a concern for you or the Danish government in general that NGOs tend to have a good 
relationship with the press and are able to use the press as a tool? 
 
B: It became a problem during the actual negotiations, because when these very tough situations 
arose it was pretty easy for destructive forces to play this against us. 
 
M: When you say destructive forces ...? 
 
B: The OPEC-countries and the ALBA-countries around Venezuela, which of course is the OPEC 
also, but Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba and these countries. There was a very sad, in my view, tendency 
for the NGOs to buy their agenda, as if that was ambitious. And obviously the other countries and 
the OPEC countries were not there to make strong agreements. They were there to sabotage.  
 
M:  They went to the press with these issues or?  
 
B: To the press and the NGOs.  
 
M: Did that influence you when reading that in the press? 
 
B: I mean it influenced the negotiations. 
 	 119	
M: Ok 
 
D: But it did not change your position? 
 
B: Position is a difficult term for someone who is trying to broker an agreement. The Presidency in 
an international negotiation cannot put pressure or position anything. What we can do, and what we 
did, was of course to get people together and try to map out: if I have understood your position right, 
and your position and your position. You actually ought, the three of you, to be able to agree to this. 
And if you look carefully we have tried to avoid the red lines that you do not want to cross and you 
cannot cross. This is actually a text trying to chart out a compromise between the three of you, to 
the best of our ability, try to read it, try to see whether we could actually agree. That is the role of 
Presidency. It is: “you eat this China, you eat this US, you eat this EU”. It does not work like that. 
No one has that authority.  
 
M: Were the Danish NGOs able to set the agenda in any way at the negotiations?  It feels like what 
you are saying is international NGOs are more successful in doing this.  
 
B: I would not say they were ‘very’ successful in this. But in general, I felt that they had a better 
understanding of the reality of the negotiation. They were more listening into what the countries 
had actually said. For example, you take the World Resources Institute, which is basically an 
American organisation. I mean, they knew for a fact there was not one member of the American 
Congress, let alone any member of the administration, that would ever dream of signing anything 
like what Europe asked for. They did not waste their time discussing whether there should be a 
legally binding treaty. 
 
M: Which strategies did they use? More knowledge sharing? 
 
B: They tried more to look into the realm of possibilities. What would conceivably be acceptable 
for China, for India, or for the US? And what we ended up with what was the Copenhagen Accord, 
a document that was extremely weak. It was not even approved. It was only taken note of and all 
the rest of it. I just note, that it is the first document ever, in the entire history of climate 
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negotiations since 1992, that actually provides a formula for everyone to contribute to reductions, 
and it is exactly the goal and the model that Paris is trying to establish. 
 
I am often saying to provoke people that the reason it created such controversy, is not that it was 
weak - which it was - but that it was too strong. That is why China and the US had such difficulties 
agreeing to it, because for the first time there was actually a text that actually included 
commitments from both China and the US and everyone else. That is what made it so controversial. 
We were in a way a step too far ahead, because many countries were not prepared for that kind of 
agreement. Because as you, of course know, the formality is one issue, the other is Common But 
Differentiated Responsibility, and in the Kyoto sense, this means that only the “then industrialized 
countries” contribute, which of course in nonsense today. The Copenhagen Accord was trying to 
find a way out of that dilemma by these voluntary national commitments from everyone at a 
differentiated level. So that structure tried to solve the problem that we did not solve in 1992 when 
we made the Convention. 
 
M: So now you have said earlier that it is quite important for the Danish governments to include the 
NGOs and the civil society. So how much was your strategy dependant on NGO participation? 
 
B: Not much. It is fundamentally an intergovernmental negotiation and a negotiation between 
governments. 
 
M: That is the ideal at least. 
 
B: But, the engagement and contribution in the real economy by, not only NGOs, but to a very large 
part global companies and industries, are an extremely important part of it. But they are not part of 
the actual negotiations. If you understand the distinction.  
 
M: Was there at some stage where you decided as the government that now we are not going to 
listen to NGOs anymore? 
 
B: No. We listened to them, and we discussed with them and we had good dialogue with them, but 
obviously they were not in the negotiating room. You have to understand that a negotiation is not a 
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forum in which everyone has an equal voice. It is a room where you try to hammer out a hard 
bargain between countries, which have real interests at stake, and they are represented not by their 
NGOs but by their governments.  These governments have all sorts of agendas, and not all of them 
are very ideal, and you have to cope with that reality. That is what you are trying to cope with. 
 
M: Were there some NGOs you listened to more than others? Now you kind of touched upon it with 
international versus Danish NGOs. 
 
B: I do not want to sort of be distancing myself from Danish NGOs, I just think they were 
fundamentally going after the wrong goal. They partly excluded themselves from the mainstream 
discussions, because their focus was on something that was very local, very European and very 
much off the mark. It was never part of the negotiations. Incidentally they are still very obsessed 
about this legal form, and they still term this ambitious agreement being a legally binding 
agreement, which cannot and will not be approved. 
 
D: Some of the positions that the Danish NGOs took, which was more on the measuring sides, as 
you mentioned, did you use them in your arguments? Or did you notice that anyone else took their 
position and used them in their discussions? 
 
B: I think the extent to which international NGOs can help organise the will or the pull of 
international civil society. The main impact of that is not governance, but industry. Industry is very 
sensitive to a coherent push from consumers, and in my view we still have not opened that toolbox. 
I think NGOs still have to realise how much influence they could exercise if they focused on 
organising civil society instead of pressurizing governments. Because the real influence of civil 
society is not on government. Because governments in the final analysis listen to voters, not to 
NGOs, and in my view we should not blame them. If you are an elected politician you listen to your 
voters: that is where the democracy works. If you are not an elected politician, and you do not listen 
to your voters, you listen to other constituencies in your own country outside your democracy, but 
you certainly do not listen to NGOs. The real scope of influence for NGOs is to the extent NGOs 
can actually organise the collective will, of course not of the entire global civil society, but of a 
significant part of it.  If you can tell industry: we do not want to buy products that do not live up to 
this, that or the other benchmark, or we will advise each other, as consumers, not to buy this 
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sweatshirt instead of that sweatshirt, because of the green footprint between that and another brand. 
That would have a tremendous impact. 
 
D: Would you not say civil society is also voters?  
 
B: Yes voters. 
 
D: Yes and voters can punish governments. 
 
B: Yes of course, but you see there is a dilemma here. If you have voters in a society, in a 
democratic society, they have a series of different interests: they are farmers, consumers, they are 
mothers, they are left-wing or they are right-wing, and within that entire range they cast their votes 
every fourth year for politicians that take a mandate out of that while balancing environment, 
economic growth or whatever. 
 
D: So you do not think NGOS cover that range of voters at all? 
 
B: No. Of course some voters, who organise themselves because they have a particular interest in a 
subject, and they use the democratic right, that they have, to express this, to highlight this, to 
discuss this, to provide information on it or to raise attention on these issues. Which is part of 
democracy, but for the politicians, the fact that you have a fragment of your voters who are very 
interested in a particular issue, is of course something any politician balance against: what do my 
voters actually think on this? And again, there are different mechanisms within a country that is not 
democratic, but the fact that you have say 1 percent of the voters having a very strong opinion on 
something and being very expressive about it does not commit elected politician to go down that 
road. 
 
I do not think many elected politicians see it that way. I think they look very much at what their 
voters say, and it may well be the voters are not in agreement with that one percent or less that is 
actually NGOs. Which does not change the right of NGOs too, but I guess my own advice, as a 
member of civil society, is, if you want to have influence as an NGO you get much more influence 
if you actually look towards specific action. The least obvious strategy for NGOs, in my view, is to 
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try to influence governments. It is much more efficient to influence through organising civil society. 
Much, much more. But it is much less visible, and it is an aspect of that as well that NGOS are also 
fundraising organisations and they also need attention in the press, and they also need agendas and 
actions that provide attention and funding: so there is also a dilemma there. But that is something 
you should discuss with the NGOs, not me. 
 
D: You did not actively use the NGOS for instance creating knowledge that you can use? 
 
B: On the knowledge side, I must say that those who provided most knowledge were some of the 
huge internationals. There was an organization in the lead up to COP15 that you may or may not 
call an NGO. I do not know, but have you heard of Project Catalyst? 
 
M: No 
 
B: Project Catalyst was a huge information-network established by a number of big American 
foundations basically: Hewlett-Packard, Oak and a few others. I think they raised 1 billion dollars. 
A huge amount of money. And what they basically did was to establish representations in most 
major emitting countries: the US, China, India. And from within their administrations try to 
calculate the cost of reductions in various sectors and McKinseys Global Research Program were 
hired to do a lot of the calculations, so they had one of the biggest “commercial calculating 
machines” behind them, and many of the governments in the developing countries, being 
completely unfamiliar with the reality: the economy of the subject, they used Project Catalyst for 
their own calculations and analysis of what would be the cost of this action or the other, and they 
made  this famous cost curve, which was a curve trying to figure out where you would get most 
reductions  for the least price. Most simply, energy efficiency is often at the left side of the cost 
curve. It is a cheaper way where normally the cost is less that zero.  
 
So by trying to provide individual governments with tools and instruments of policies that would 
actually help reducing their emissions at the lowest possible price, even without a price, was the 
sort of the main target of the Project Catalyst, and they had set up joints all over the world, and they 
tried to feed these calculations into the negotiations by trying to help individual parties to raise their 
ambitions by showing them how they could actually reduce. And we used those calculations a lot, 
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when we were sitting with partners to try to figure out: Where is your red line? What is your 
ambition? To have these calculations and say: your own government has been cooperating with 
Project Catalyst and here is the calculations, and if you were actually to lower subsidies for fossil 
fuel, if you were actually to increase demand for housing and increase energy efficiency, you could 
actually in three years get a return on your investment and reduce your emissions by 20 %. So why 
do you not go for that? So, we are trying in that way to show countries that reducing emissions was 
actually possible. That was the main NGO contribution. 
 
M: Is there some sort of informal agreement that if we provide you with knowledge you provide an 
NGO with more access to the negotiations? 
 
B: No, but it is obvious that if you make yourself relevant, you are closer to the process. It is natural. 
What Project Catalyst did was that they were actually in capitals. They were in capitals going to the 
entities responsible for productions asking them: Can we help you? We have knowledge examples 
from all over the world, we have accumulated databases: May we be of assistance to you to find 
ways of reducing emissions? And most countries accepted that offer which that of course gave 
Project Catalyst a lot of information about the Chinese energy sector etc. So they increased their 
knowledge to a very high level, which made them useful for us. But they would never go out and 
lobby. They were very smart economists basically. Many of them were very smart and very young 
economists. But, I would not consider them any less idealistic than other NGO, but they did not 
have a public base. They had public foundation money to finance their activities, and they were 
actually providing a lot of information that was extremely useful. You know, people who run out in 
the streets wearing big ice bear-suit and making funny stunts, I mean, it is funny, but it does not 
inform anyone. It may inform the public, but it does not inform the negotiations.  
 
M: But does demonstrations not inform the public or the press…? 
 
B: Inform about what? 
 
M: About the issue of climate change? 
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B: I mean, it may raise awareness that their is an issue, and that is of course, why NGOs do it, but 
for the people who are spending 24 hours a day negotiating it…. 
 
M: You do not pay any attention to that outside? 
 
B: No, because it does not increase the information to negotiators and it does not help you to try to 
figure out on how to get to the strongest possible deal. 
 
M: We know for a fact that the press was not allowed within the negotiations, so they talked a lot 
with the NGOs. Did you try and talk to the press as well? 
 
B: Yes, we did, but it is very hard within the negotiations. I am now again assuming that you are 
three different parties to the convention. If we are discussing together a possible compromise 
between the three of you, the least thing I have a mandate to do is to go out and brief the press about 
the development of your positions. So the Presidency in the crucial stages of negotiation have to be 
extremely careful not to make anything public that those countries, that are actually trying to move 
their positions and find a compromise, do not want to tell. If you want to kill negotiations you do 
what many delegations did at the Bella Centre and brief the press. 
 
M: Is that why the NGOs were not allowed on the Danish delegation team? 
 
B: It was said many, many times in the negotiations that it is all about confidence, which of course 
is true, but confidence is many things, and it is very easy when you have 200 countries that have to 
agree something by consensus that anyone would say: we lack confidence in the rest of you, and in 
the end that is sort of a blame game, but to allow NGOs into the room where countries are seeking 
out each other to see whether they can find a compromise, is not feasible, and if you do it, it is 
because you are more preoccupied with blame game and the press side than actually finding an 
agreement.  
 
M: But did you not fear the power of the press? 
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B: Yes, but we were more preoccupied with trying to find an agreement. For us it was not a 
propaganda stunt, and if it had been a propaganda stunt we would of done things very differently. It 
would have been much easier with much better press, but our ambition was to actually get the main 
parties to conceive of a common approach and is actually what we succeeded in doing. We knew 
that would give us very bad press.  
 
M: But it did not matter?  
 
B: It was not our priority. Our priority was to trying to find a way to broker, for the first time, 
something that could become the basis for a new agreement. Looking back on it, it was very, very 
tough, we got a lot of bad press and a lot of sandbagging, but I am pretty proud of the actual result. 
There are a lot of things I am not proud of, and things I would personally like to have done different, 
or things my old government should have done differently, but the basic core of the Copenhagen 
Accord is the only thing that is now providing any hope that we will get to a result in Paris. 
 
M: So the bad press did not play any issue at all? For you as a government? 
 
B: It played a lot of issues. I mean, any government is sensitive to bad press. 
 
M: I am just thinking of whether it is a very strong power tool for the NGOs to use? 
 
B: Especially when they are using it destructively. So it is a very strong destructive power. 
 
M: Is that something you felt at the COP15?  
 
B: Very much so. I have no reason to believe that the NGOs were behind the leaks, but I think some 
parties, who feared we were actually getting toward some sort of success, were behind the leaks, 
and that the way the press decided to play, and the NGOs, helped them destroy negotiations. 
 
M: If you could of done anything differently, would you of focused more on the press? 
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B: You know, now I work with the press, and I think it is in the nature of these things that everyone 
hopes for more. So naturally it is an extremely pressing problem, it is extremely important to get 
global agreements, and we are all very, very preoccupied, and therefore we all have this hope that 
somehow someone will get together and just fix it. And get out with a sort of a comprehensive 
agreement, but when you think about it, we would not allow the EU to regulate what people hope 
the climate negotiations should regulate globally: interpretation, culture, earth use or power. We are 
struggling even at the national level with these goals.  
 
The idea that every country on earth in two weeks would agree to something that is far more 
comprehensive than the UN treaty or anything that has ever been agreed, even at Rio, is completely 
inconceivable. It cannot happen. And therefore it was a very, very delicate task for us, as the 
Presidency, to try to at the same time not to raise expectations to high to a level, which we knew 
would be impossible, while at the same time keeping the ambitions and the momentum for actually 
getting something agreed. And one of the things where we failed in Copenhagen was exactly that. 
We were very, very close to the US attorney general, and he started in September and we started in 
September to try to reduce the level of expectations and try to say that there will be no legally 
binding agreement and that there will be no specific commitments to reductions targets. And at the 
same time we were of course under very strong pressure from the NGOs and civil society to keep 
up expectations: PUT PRESSURE ON THEM, PUT PRESSURE ON THEM! This was a very 
difficult dilemma, and it was very hard to make these two things meet, and I think the French will 
see the same things happening in Paris. I think something will be agreed in Paris: a little core 
agreement like the Copenhagen Accord agreement with the national contributions coming in, and 
that will be a little bit stronger than in Copenhagen, it will be more formalised, there will be more 
countries agreeing: so it will be stronger and better than Copenhagen, but building on the same 
model. So hopefully it will be stronger in Paris, but surely not good enough, not strong enough, so it 
very much depends on your mood or political position whether you say: YES! We have moved the 
world a little further toward a solution, or you say the opposite: NO we have not done that yet.  
 
M: Now we have talked a lot about NGOs and civil society, but did you also cooperate or feel 
pressured by multinational corporations during the COP15?  
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B: We had a very, very extensive cooperation with multinational corporations and global 
enterprises. We had this whole series of conferences going on at the same time: huge conferences, 
business conference, press conferences etc, in order to engage civil society, and I actually think that 
many of the global enterprises played a very constructive part, but I also miss a lot at the same time 
civil society to hold them up to there promises.  
 
M: How did they play a constructive part? 
 
B: They played a constructive part by being very clear in their messaging to politicians, that what 
they need is a clear level playing field. They want clear rules, they want transparency, they want 
clear signals from governments: this it the agreement you have to operate under. They wanted 
agreements, and they were very explicit about that. This will be very explicit in Paris too. So in that 
way they were sending signals to politicians much better than just leaving everything in flux: Please 
give us an agreement and what are the terms? But saying this does not imply that they all would 
agree to what terms.  
 
D: A lot of people argue that the fact that so many heads of state were present at COP15 was 
actually due to the work of NGOs, as they manages to create so much focus on the COP. Do you 
agree on that? 
B: I tend to believe it was just down to the importance of the issue. I think basically almost all 
governments know that this issue is extremely important, not only in the long term, but also in the 
short term in regards to their growth, their development, competiveness etc.  
 
M: Thank you for your time, Bo.  
 
